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Scythe
Proceedings and Bulletin of the 
International Data Farming 
Community
It is appropriate that the publication 
supporting the International Data 
Farming Workshop is named after a 
farming implement. In farming, a 
scythe is used to clear and harvest. We 
hope that the “Scythe” will perform a 
similar role for our data farming 
community by being a tool to help 
prepare for our data farming efforts 
and harvest the results. The Scythe is 
provided to all attendees of the 
Workshops. Electronic copies may be 
obtained from harvest.nps.edu.  
Please contact the editors for 
additional paper copies.
Please let us know what you think of 
this sixth prototypical issue. Articles, 
ideas for articles and material, and 
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International Data Farming Community
Overview
The International Data Farming Community is a 
consortium of researchers interested in the study of 
Data Farming, its methodologies, applications, 
tools, and evolution.
The primary venue for the Community is the 
biannual International Data Farming Workshops, 
where researchers participate in team-oriented 
model development, experimental design, and 
analysis using high performance computing 
resources... that is, Data Farming. 
Scythe, Proceedings and Bulletin of the 
International Data Farming Community, Issue 6, 





The Naval Postgraduate School was excited to host International Data Farming Workshop 18!  It was held from March 22nd 
through the 27th, 2009.  Our theme was “Dynamic Truths,” and the goal, as usual, was to use our data farming methods to 
continue to explore our important questions.  The plan continues to be to hold even-numbered workshops once a year in 
Monterey with odd-numbered workshops taking place at international venues.
As the executive director of the Center, it is my pleasure to work with many from around the world to develop the methods 
of Data Farming and apply them to important questions of our day.  And on behalf of the co-directors of the SEED Center for 
Data Farming, Professors Tom Lucas and Susan Sanchez, I would like to express our thanks to the team leaders, the plenary 
speakers and all of the participants in IDFW 18.
This issue, our sixth, of The Scythe contains a summary of each work team effort.  And as always, the plenary session 
materials, in-briefs, and out-briefs from this workshop are available online at http://harvest.nps.edu along with electronic copies 
of this issue of The Scythe.
Now looking ahead, our Data Farming community will be in Auckland, New Zealand for our next workshop, International 
Data Farming Workshop 19.  I would like to invite you to participate, starting with the opening dinner on Sunday 1 November 
2009 and continuing through the week with the closing session on Friday 6 November.  Our theme for IDFW 19 is... ”Mana.” In 
the Maori culture, having mana means to have influence, authority, effectiveness, power, usefulness, and prestige.
We hope to see you there (with all of your mana)!        Gary Horne
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This study investigated maritime protection using the 
Automated Co-Evolution (ACE) framework developed in 
Singapore. The scenario examined involved a frigate having 
to defend a high-value but poorly protected target vessel 
(HVT) from pirate or Fast Intruder Attack Craft (FIAC). The 
outcomes for the study were to determine whether ACE 
could come up with feasible tactics for both Blue and Red 
forces, and as a secondary objective, to gain insights into the 
scenario itself.
Additionally, a new version of the MANA model was 
used and evaluated for the work. This version, MANA 5, uses 
continuous coordinates and vectors to determine the position 
and movement of the agents in the scenario, rather than the 
cellular paradigm used in previous versions of MANA. This 
allows the model to represent both the long-range and short-
range interactions in the scenario, without artifacts caused by 
coarseness of scale that would have occurred if earlier 
versions were used. 
DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO
In this scenario the Blue Force consists of a generic frigate 
and a troop carrying vessel with limited armament. In 
addition, Blue Force was given a group of Rigid Hull 
Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) for some excursions. While not well 
armed, the intention was that the RHIBs could act to 
determine Red Force’s intent early. The Red Force consists of 
a group of seven FIACs, three of which are suicide bombers, 
and the remaining four armed with RPGs. 
Additionally, neutral vessels were added as a scenario 
variation. These vessels could not be distinguished from the 
FIACs beyond visual range, and so served to confuse the Blue 
Force’s situational awareness at long range.
Critically, the Red Force is not a conventional military 
threat, so its intention must be determined before Blue Force 
may engage it. 
The version of the scenario used for the ACE runs 
included both the RHIBs and the neutral vessels, though it 
turned out that these did not play a large role in the tactical 
outcomes.
KEY ASSUMPTIONS
The critical assumptions for this scenario concerned the 
Rules of Engagement. Two factors would be at play for an 
actual operation of the type depicted in this scenario:
1. Under what conditions would Blue Force be 
allowed to begin engaging Red Force?
2. Given the presence of non-combatants, which 
weapons would be available to the frigate to use? 
(i.e. Is collateral damage an issue?)
For this analysis, it was deemed that Red Force’s intent 
could be gauged if it came within 500m of Blue Force. 
Furthermore, no restrictions were placed on the weapons 
systems that could be used by the frigate, except as a later 
excursion.
We further assume that the Red Force is deemed 
successful if it causes any kind of damage to the HVT (i.e. it 
does not necessarily have to sink it).
Here we do not contend that these assumptions are 
realistic, rather the intention is to determine what each side 
should do given these assumptions.
KEY MODELING PARAMETERS
Blue Force. For the ACE runs, the Blue Force consisted of the 
frigate, HVT, and two RHIBs. The characteristics for these 
vessels were:
• HVT. The HVT was assumed to be lightly armed and 
could reach a top speed of 28 knots. 
• Frigate. The frigate was modeled to be well-armed 
with a  5 inch main gun at the bow, a rear Phalanx 
CIWS 1B, as well as port/starboard stabilized 50cal 
guns. The frigate was assumed to be positioned 
randomly within 2km of the HVT. The frigate could 
also reach a top speed of 28 knots, with some inertia 
modeling. 
• RHIBs. Two RHIBs were modeled as fast moving 
boats with light arms. Their main use was to scout for 
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adversarial presence and to inform the HVT and 
frigate early. 











Table 1: Specifications of Blue Force
Note: Detection for the RHIBs is assumed to be supplied 
by a comms link to the frigate. To save computational 
overhead, this was represented by giving the RHIBs the same 
sensor as the frigate.
Red Force. The Red Force consisted of seven FIACs. Four 
FIACs were armed with RPGs capable of launching attacks 
within 100m range while three FIACs were close-range 
suicide bombers. The FIACs were assumed to have a 
maximum speed of 35 knots.  A summary of the modeling 
parameters used is listed in Table 2 below.
Maximum Speed (knots) 35
Detection/ID Range (m) 500
RPG Range (m) 100
Table 2: Specifications of Red Force FIACs
Neutral. More than 30 neutral ships were added to model 
the difficulty faced by the RHIBs in identifying hostile craft 
along a busy shipping channel.
METHODOLOGY
Refinement of Baseline Scenario
The team members first started with a round of discussion to 
fine-tune the baseline scenario. Several quick Red-Teaming 
runs were initially conducted on ACE to evaluate the 
modifications before arriving at the finalized baseline for 
Red and Blue force plans (illustrated on Figure 1 below). 
Figure 1: Baseline Blue/Red force plans
Automated Co-Evolution (ACE)
ACE1  was developed by DSO National Laboratories, 
Singapore. It is a two-sided competitive co-evolution 
algorithm, which provides a vehicle for understanding the 
dynamics of competition in a military context. 
The key benefit of this framework is to complement the 
manually intensive process of developing plans of action by 
automatically generating plans that perform well and are 
relatively robust even in the face of an adaptive Red 
adversary. Potential applications of ACE include supporting 
of military doctrine/tactics development, operational plan 
evaluation and acquisition programs.
An overview of ACE is shown below:
Applying ACE
A total of 5 co-evolutions, each constituting one round of 
Blue Teaming vs. Red Teaming, were conducted automatically 
using ACE. The two tables below show the ACE run settings, 
and the ranges for  the MANA parameters that were to be 
evolved.
Co-Evolution Settings Co-Evo Gen 5Comparison Size 1
EPGA Settings
Max EPGA Gen 6
Max Individual 40
Parents 10
Model Settings Replicates 20
Total Runs ~28000
Time Taken Condor Cluster ~ 20 hrs
Table 3: ACE run settings
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1 “A Co-evolution Approach for Military Operational Analysis” by Choo et. al, 2009 World Summit on Genetic and Evolutionary Computation.
Blue Parameters Min Value Max Value
Dispersion of RHIBs -100 100
Aggression of frigate 
against FIACs -100 100
Cohesion of frigate with 
HVT -100 100
Red Parameters Min Value Max Value












Table 4: Red and Blue Parameters for Co-evolution
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
As required by the heuristic optimization function within 
ACE, objective functions involving the MOEs were designed. 
Based on the scenario, it was decided that the function 
would depend on the following MOEs:
• Mean HVT attrition (Primary Objective)
• Mean Red Force attrition (Secondary Objective as a tie 
breaker)
Hence Blue Force would seek to minimise mean HVT 
attrition and maximise Red Force attrition.  In contrast, Red 
Force would seek to maximise mean HVT attrition and 
minimize Red Force attrition.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Baseline Scenario 
Table 5 below shows a cyclic outcome from the 5 co-
evolution cycles of Blue Teaming vs. Red Teaming.
No. Pop Name RedCas HVTCas
1 BlueCoEvo 1 1.65 0
2 RedCoEvo 1 2.15 0.95
3 BlueCoEvo 2 2.35 0
4 RedCoEvo 2 5.3 0.85
5 BlueCoEvo 3 6.6 0
6 RedCoEvo 3 5.8 0.35
7 BlueCoEvo 4 5.25 0
8 RedCoEvo 4 2.5 0.35
9 BlueCoEvo 5 3.05 0
10 RedCoEvo 5 6.25 0.4
Table 5: Baseline Scenario MOEs
Figure 2: Evolution of Mean HVT Attrition
Cyclic outcome. Zooming in on the results for MOE 1 
(Figure 2 above), the team observed that Blue Force could 
successfully evolve stable defensive tactics (after the 2nd co-
evolution cycle) that resulted in less than 50% success for the 
Red Force counterattacks. MOE 2 (mean Red Force casualties) 
did not produce meaningful correlation to MOE 1 as it was 
included mainly as a tie breaker. The team observed 
surprising maneuvering tactics which saw the frigate 
purposefully following behind the HVT’s escape trail. In 
addition to maintaining a constant watch and safety buffer 
distance for the HVT, this strategy successfully created open 
spaces for the frigate to separate the FIACs and to achieve 
higher kills against individual FIAC targets as illustrated in 
Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: Co-evolved Blue plan
To counter this Blue Force tactic, Red Force’s co-evolved 
plans were to launch synchronized saturation assaults. FIACs 
were observed to simultaneously swarm so that the HVT had 
little reaction time and space to escape (See Figure 4a). 
Another possible tactic would be to send waves of en masse 
attacks to overwhelm the frigate and thus creating possible 
openings for at least one FIAC to slip through and to charge 
towards the HVT (See Figure 4b). 
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Figures 4a & 4b: Co-evolved Red Force plan
Additional Scenarios
To further explore these findings, the team decided to create 
two variants of the baseline scenario to study the impact of 
splitting the FIACs so that they can attack from both North 
and South directions (“Split FIACs”), and to weaken the 
weapon effectiveness of the frigate to understand whether 
there can be tactical solutions for Blue Force to overcome this 
reduced performance (“Weaken frigate”):
(a)Split FIACs (b)Weaken frigate
No. Pop Name RedCas HVTCas RedCas HVTCas
1 BlueCoEvo 1 6.85 0.1 2.5 0.8
2 RedCoEvo 1 4.85 0.9 0.35 1
3 BlueCoEvo 2 6.45 0.35 0.85 0.85
4 RedCoEvo 2 3.25 1 0.15 1
5 BlueCoEvo 3 5.3 0.05 1.75 0.85
6 RedCoEvo 3 1.65 1 0.7 1
7 BlueCoEvo 4 6.8 0.1 1.45 0.9
8 RedCoEvo 4 4.4 1 0.55 1
9 BlueCoEvo 5 5.6 0.2 1.1 0.95
10 RedCoEvo 5 2.2 1 0.05 1
Table 6: MOEs for Split FIACs and Weaken frigate
(a) Results for Split FIACs scenario
Figure 5: Evolution of Mean HVT Attrition (Split FIACs)
Cyclic outcome. With four FIACs coming from the north 
and three from the south, the results now showed a 
significant deterioration in the situation for Blue Force. For 
every Blue Force evolved tactic, Red Force was always able to 
find successful countering tactics to ensure close to 100% HVT 
attrition (seen in Figure 5 above). For every Red Force 
evolved tactic, Blue Force was unable to find countering 
tactics to ensure 100% HVT survivability. While the Blue 
Force’s evolved tactics were similar to the baseline scenario, 
the FIACs’  plan was to first draw the frigate towards the 
north to face the higher density of FIACs.  Pre-occupied with 
the engagements, the frigate would likely lose contact with 
the fleeing HVT, thus allowing the remaining FIACs to easily 
flank the frigate and attack the unprotected HVT, as shown in 
Figure 6 below.
Figure 6: Co-evolved Red Force plan for Split FIACs
(b) Results for Weaken frigate scenario
Red Force dominant outcome. The team observed that 
the weakened frigate, without the 5-inch gun, was unable to 
perform the task of protecting the HVT. This could be seen 
from the trend of mean HVT attrition evolving towards the 
100% level in Figure 7 below. Even though the frigate tried to 
remain close to the HVT, the frigate was regularly 
overwhelmed by the FIACs when the FIACs chose to attack in 
numbers. The results show that Blue Force was unable to 
develop good strategies to counter the Red Force, and even 
more so when the FIACs split up. 
Figure 7: Evolution of Mean HVT Attrition (Weaken frigate)
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
One-sided compared to Two-sided attack.  The results show 
that the additional degree of freedom given to the FIACs in 
attacking from two sides rather than just a single side will 
pose a much greater challenge to the Blue Force.  Instead of 
just trying to saturate the frigate (in the one-sided case), the 
FIACs can attempt to lure the frigate away from the HVT 
and then attack an unprotected HVT easily.
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Performance of frigate weapon systems.  The team 
assumed a rather optimistic weapon performance for the 
frigate against the FIAC class of targets.  In the scenario of the 
weakened frigate, we noticed immediate dominance by the 
Red Force.  This finding suggests that if sea trials show that 
the frigate’s weapon systems have limited performance 
against FIACs, additional Blue Force capabilities may need to 
be introduced. Note however that the weakened frigate case 
reflected a much lower level of firepower than a frigate could 
potentially have (this was achieved by removing the frigate 
main gun and CWIS, as if these weapons could not be used 
due to the potential for collateral damage).
CONCLUSIONS
This work successfully demonstrated that ACE was able 
to generate sensible and optimized tactics for both the Red 
and Blue forces using MANA 5. This reinforces the findings 
of Workshop 14 where Singapore’s Automatic Red Teaming 
(ART) was used to establish the feasibility of using 
evolutionary algorithms to develop tactics; on that occasion 
for a single side.
In short, the best tactics for the Red Force were to split up 
and attempt to lure the frigate away from the HVT. 
Alternatively, if possible the Red Force could attempt to 
overwhelm the frigate by launching a swarming attack. 
Conversely, Blue Force’s best tactic was for the HVT to move 
away from the Red Force, but for the frigate to move more 
slowly, so as to become relatively closer to the Red Force, but 
when not engaging the Red Force to move back towards the 
HVT.
We note that this was an abstract scenario and did not 
necessarily represent accurately the true firepower of the 
frigate or  FIACs. Furthermore, our assumptions about Rules 
of Engagement, acceptable tactics and objectives of each side 
may not be representative of actual situations in current 
operational theatres.
Nonetheless, they still provide some interesting insights 
into maritime force protection scenarios, and a good starting 
point for more detailed analysis. It is therefore believed that 
ACE results would make a useful contribution to mission 
planning and acquisition analysis.
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Team 2: Final Report:  Unmanned Casualty 
Evacuation (CASEVAC) in the Distributed Environment
TEAM 2 MEMBERS
Ralph Featherstone - Lead
Ed Lesnowicz
Naval Postgraduate School, US
Anna Gordon
George Washington University, US
Bill Hoffman




The current battlefield is changing rapidly.  Combat 
operations against irregular forces are set in a dispersed, 
non-linear battlefield.  Vast distances between small units 
such as the infantry squad and the distances from these 
small elements to their supporting organizations pose 
unique challenges.  Casualty evacuation is one of these 
challenges.  
The goal of casualty evacuation is to transport an injured 
Marine from the point of injury to life saving surgical care 
quickly.  The first 60 minutes after a traumatic injury is 
referred to as the “golden hour.”  The chances of survival  for 
critically injured trauma patients depend on immediate 
surgical care.  Increased dispersion results in longer distances 
from the point of injury to medical care facilities with a 
corresponding increase in the delay between the time of 
injury and life saving surgical care.  The non-linear aspects of 
this battlefield increase the threat to aircraft crews and 
platforms conducting casualty evacuation.  Aerial CASEVAC, 
executed with manned assets, places additional lives at risk.
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) offer an alternative 
means of air casualty evacuation. This alternative may 
provide time-critical response while reducing threat to aircraft 
crews.
The specific objective for Team 2 at IDFW 18 was to 
determine which performance factors of a UAS has the 
greatest impact on CASEVAC.
Ineffective CASEVAC Can Cost Lives
During CASEVAC, the patient is stabilized before transport 
because, unlike medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), emergency 
care may not be provided en route.  
Treatment time lost en route, and greater distances from 
the point of injury (POI) to life-saving surgical care, creates a 
need for faster reaction and reduced travel times.
Boeingʼs Unmanned Little Bird (ULB) Provides 
a Unique Opportunity for Live Force 
Experimentation
With a maximum speed of 134 mph, a range of 379 miles, 
and flight ceiling of 7,300 ft, the ULB is well suited for use as 
an experimental aircraft in the context of unmanned 
CASEVAC.  Its small size (23-ft length, 26.35-0ft width, and 
8.14-ft height) allows for entry into landing zones that would 
otherwise be impractical for larger aircraft.  The ability to 
take off with a maximum weight greater than 3,500 lbs 
provides the flexibility to deliver  supplies and transport 
casualties.
Figure 1: Boeing’s Unmanned Little Bird
SCENARIO
There are three platoon locations, separated by over 50 miles. 
Casualties are experienced over a 96  hour time window. 
UAS(s) is dispatched to retrieve casualties.  The forward 
operating base (FOB) is centrally located with UAS support 
and surgical care.  Casualties are evacuated between 5 and 
45  miles from the FOB.  Any casualties inside of 5 miles will 
be evacuated via ground transportation.  
A casualty-causing event where there is no longer a threat 
present near the POI is modeled.  There are, however, three 
threat cases.
• High Threat - The high threat case models a casualty-
causing event in which the threat is located in close 
proximity to the POI and along the route of flight of the 
UAS.
• Area Threat - The threat is near the POI.
• Route Threat - The threat, in this case, is located along 
the flight route.
Basic Assumptions for CASEVAC Model
• All casualties were properly stabilized and triaged before 
transport.
• Patient status did not degrade during the evacuation 
flight.
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• Surgical care was collocated with the ULB launch and 
recovery site.
• All radio communications were reliable.
Agent Descriptions
Five agent types are used in this simulation:  the casualty, the 
UAS, the Direct Air Support Center (DASC), the surgical 
care facility, and the threat.
• The UAS agents used in the model were constructed 
with location, speed, survivability, capacity, and route 
characteristics.
oCASEVAC – When casualty notification is received, the 
UAS flies to the location of the casualty, retrieves the 
casualty, and then moves to the drop-off location.
• The surgical care facility was the finish line for evacuated 
casualties.
• The DASC received and processed all CASEVAC 
requests.
• The enemy combatants were given a location, sensor 
range, probability of detection, and probability of kill 
characteristics.
• Casualty agents are characterized by instances and 
location.
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
The MOE for this model was mission completion time 
(MCT).
Factor Value Range Explanation
Casualties 1…18 The number of casualties sustained
UASs 1...4 The number of UASs available
Speed (m/s) 46.3...115.7 Airspeed (meters per second)
Litters 1...8 The number of rescue litters that are carried by each UAS
Altitude (m) 304.8…1524 The cruise altitude of the UAS
Load (s) 300...420 Time for UAS to descend, land, and climb to level flight
Enemy Sensor 
Range (m) 0…4828 Sensor range of the enemy
Probability of 
Detection 0.65...0.95
The probability the enemy detects the UAS 
within sensor range
Probability of Kill 0.05…0.03 The probability that the enemy shoots down a UAS
Table 1: Situational factors are in blue, aircraft characteristic 
factors are in green, mission process time factors are in yellow, 
and enemy capability factors are in gray. 
The conditions of the distributed environment influenced 
the choice of experimental factors, which were grouped into 
four categories:  situational, aircraft characteristics, mission 
process times and enemy capabilities.  Aircraft characteristics 
and mission process times are controllable factors.  Situational 
and enemy capabilities are uncontrollable by the decision 
maker.  Table 1 summarizes the input parameters and ranges 
used in the experiment.
MODELS
The Joint Test and Evaluation Agent Model (JTEAM) and 
Pythagoras models were the programs chosen to model UAS 
interaction in the distributed environment.  JTEAM is a 
farmable ABM; time-stepped, and three-dimensional. 
Pythagoras provides the ability to model the terrain of the 
operating environment.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The first runs with the JTEAM model were done without 
mission process time delays.  This provided the same MCT 
for each design point.  
The model was updated and a second batch of runs was 
executed.  In this iteration, the enemy threat was too robust. 
The model was run approximately 1000 times.  Of those, the 
unmanned asset was shot down 331 times.  Presently, JTEAM 
is being updated to account for  this.  Results of the JTEAM 
model are forthcoming.
Pythagoras Output
Analysis of the initial output proved speed was only 
important in instances of one casualty.  As the output was 
further analyzed, there seemed to be some confounding 
between the speed of the UAS and the distance of the 
casualty from the FOB. 
Figure 2 shows the contour plot of the MCT as a function 
of the number of litters and the number of UASs.
Figure 3: Actual vs. Predicted plot for MCTs
The most important factors for shorter mission 
completion times in unmanned CASEVAC is the interaction of 
the number of litters with the number of casualties  followed 
by the number of UASs available.  Speed is a factor, but not 
important as initially expected.
8 - IDFW 18 - Team 2
Team 3: Total Life Cycle Management: 
Automated Model Development
TEAM 3 MEMBERS
Marine Corps Systems Command, Team Lead  
Major Stephen Mount 
Other Marine Corps Representatives
Robert Eberth (PEO Land Systems)
Mark Danison (MCSC)
Captain Jonathon Derosier (HQMC, I&L)
Naval Postgraduate School, US 
Keebom Kang
Captain Shawn Phillips
Simulation and Data Management Professionals
Jake Enholm (Claxton Logistics)
Andy Foote (Alion Science)
Larry Paige (Claxton Logistics)
Mike Tomlin (Clockwork Solutions)
Tom Turner (Concurrent Technologies)
Dan Widdis (Concurrent Technologies)
INTRODUCTION
Total Life Cycle Management (TLCM) is the process which 
enables program managers to make life-cycle decisions 
across all phases of the acquisitions process.  Life-cycle 
sustainment, operational performance issues and 
requirements are system dependant. Relevant issues arise 
from early in the process during the Material Solutions 
Analysis Phase, all the way through Operations and 
Support.  Adaptive and modular modeling and simulation 
tools have been developed to address these complex issues 
throughout the life-cycle the Marine Corps weapons 
systems.
Previous work from Naval Postgraduate School students 
has focused on the Total Life Cycle Management – 
Assessment Tool, from Clockwork Solutions.   This 
technology has been successfully used in numerous studies in 
support of program managers and logistics decision makers 
throughout the Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Systems 
Command and Headquarter Marine Corps, Installations and 
Logistics have also pursued a more scalable approach to life-
cycle modeling and simulation using EXTENDSIM 7.0.
During the International Data Farming workshop both 
simulation environments were explored using readily 
available, organic, Marine Corps availability and maintenance 
data.   Data extraction and model build times were drastically 
reduced with the use of an interface developed by Captain 
Shawn Phillips.  The ability to link Marine Corps data 
repositories and life-cycle simulations will give decision 
makers the ability to produce relevant, timely and cost-
effective solutions to system operational effectiveness issues. 
PROVIDING RELEVANT SOLUTIONS 
In addition to providing analytic rigor to standard system 
reliability, availability and maintainability assessments, 
modeling and simulation can provide the program manager 
insight into a myriad of TLCM process areas.
• System Performance Requirements: What level of 
future system performance is required in order to 
meet/exceed the desired capability?  What availability 
is required or attainable in order to meet/exceed the 
desired capability?
• Depot Maintenance Planning: Which Principal End 
Items (PEIs) would best benefit from overhaul? Which 
sub-systems are driving low reliability or availability 
numbers?
• Product Upgrade: What is the most cost-effective 
solution to upgrade the capability of a system?  Is 
continued investment in sub-system reliability or 
availability improvement worth the capital 
investment, or should extra spares be purchased?
• Product Support Plans: What are the potential 
tradeoffs when considering different product support 
plans?  How do overarching process improvements 
affect material availability and mission readiness?  
These and many other TLCM questions are potentially 
addressed using TLCM-AT and EXTENDSIM 7.0, but the 
process of data manipulation and model building is often time 
consuming and cumbersome.  While accurate results continue 
to be paramount, timeliness of analysis was the focus at IDFW 
18. 
BRIDGING THE GAP
The Bridging Operational Logistics Tool (BOLT), designed 
and implemented by Captain Shawn Phillips, enables the 
model builder to rapidly extract data from an Excel source 
file, change the model input parameters and implement 
design of experiments (DOE) for TLCM simulations.  In 
order  to assist in the verification of the two modeling 
environments the following factors were determined to be of 
interest and were varied using DOE:
• Maintenance Times
• Operational Tempo (expressed in total miles and 
average miles/hour driven in a year.)
• Vehicle Population
• Percentage of parts found to be un-repairable upon 
inspection.
• Shipping Time
• Scale of failure distribution
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The levels of these factors were set using data sources 
and technical manuals.  Without the aide of BOLT, these 
variations to the models could have possibly taken days or 
weeks to implement. During IDFW 18, team 3 was able to set 
up the parameters, analyze the input data, agree upon the 
validity of assumptions, run the simulation, and verify the 
accuracy of the results, in a single afternoon. 
In order to determine the accuracy of the results and the 
importance of the factors of interest the team used the 
following methodology: 
1. Use a time period in which data is known
2. Determine historical parts usage for the entire 
period
3. Input the parameters into the simulation for the 
first half of the period and then predict the parts 
usage for the second half.
4. Use root mean square error to measure the 
difference between simulation predictions and 
actual parts usage.
5. Determine factors of interest using statistical 
software. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The analysts using TLCM-AT and EXTENDSIM 7.0 both 
implemented the same methodology and experienced 
similar results.  Mean time between failure, vehicle 
population and operational tempo proved to be the most 
significant factors overall.  Several interactions between 
maintenance and shipping times were also noticed, but at a 
lower level.   The analyst’s ability to use BOLT and DOE to 
explore the entire decision space, when parameters are 
unknown, replaces the need to solely rely on subject matter 
expertise.  The increased knowledge that is derived from 
using DOE empowers the program manager to focus data 
collection efforts on the factors of most importance in order 
to improve a models output and predictive capability. 
Operational usage of ground combat systems is an 
especially difficult metric to capture.  In order to more fully 
explore BOLT and the two modeling platforms, a  real-world 
operational scenario was explored in which a ground 
commander would have had some prior knowledge of a 
pending deployment. Using the IDFW developed 
methodology, the team was able to accurately predict the 
observed increase in system part usage with a corresponding 
projected increase in operational tempo and vehicle 
population.  Solely based on simulation results, the 
operational commander would have only been short 17 total 
parts over the period of the deployment. This is especially 
important when planning austere contingency operations 
where parts and logistics assets are limited. 
CONCLUSIONS
IDFW 18 provided a  unique venue for a team of Government 
and industry simulation and data management professionals 
to combine their expertise in the pursuance of a common 
goal. With the implementation of BOLT, the TLCM insight 
that modeling and simulation provides is now more 
accessible to Program Managers and decision makers.  Days 
and weeks of complex data manipulation and model 
development have been successfully reduced to several 
hours of an experienced analysts time. 
The two simulation platforms exercised were similar in 
their results and modeling methodology, but their actual 
implementation will vary significantly.  The Marine Corps 
plans to use them both as complementary capabilities to 
provide both rapid and more detailed analysis.   The path 
forward should include a detailed and documented validation 
of both simulations, by the utilizing agencies, in accordance 
with the approved DoD instruction. 
For detailed explanation of TLCM modeling and 
simulation efforts in the Marine Corps and actual results from 
IDFW 18, please contact Major Stephen Mount, 
stephen.mount@usmc.mil or 703-432-3868.
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The German Federal Office of Defense Technology and 
Procurement (BWB) is interested in analyzing the influence 
of networked sensors and effectors on military capabilities in 
network centric operations.
On behalf of the BWB, about one year ago representatives 
of EADS started developing a new agent-based model that 
addresses the BWB-specific requirements.
The agent-based sensor effector 
model (ASBEM) concentrates on 
modeling complex technical aspects in 
NCO and to do so, it integrates detailed 
physical theories when it comes to 
simulating the output of various sensors 
and when determining the effect of 
different weapon systems.
 ABSEM has continuously been 
enhanced since IDFW17 so that ABSEM 
version 0.2 could be released at IDFW18. 
Using a camp protection scenario, 
the team's objective was to investigate 
the effect of different electro-optical 
sensor systems (human view, infrared, 
residual light amplifier) in combination 
with the use of direct fire weapons in 
network centric operations.
Objectives
In Data Farming experiments the team's main intention is to 
examine the performance of some given sensor and effector 
systems under varying conditions (e.g. different weather-
dependent atmospheric conditions, time of day, varying 
number of hostile units,…). To evaluate the implemented 
sensor- and effector systems various MoEs will be recorded, 
e.g. the time needed for detection   /   classification  / 
identification as well as the attrition rates for both blue and 
red forces.
Overall, the team had the following goals:
• Review and face validate ABSEM version 0.2
• Conduct experiments with different designs analyzing 
the effect of parameters such as different seasons, 
different weather conditions, distinction between day 
and night, deployment of different sensor and weapon 
systems
• Identify needs for further work.
Scenario
The IDFW18 scenario dealt with the threat posed by 
adversary invaders. The military camp is guarded by several 
watch towers occupied with soldiers equipped with electro-
optical sensors and small arms. An UAV is deployed for 
airborne reconnaissance. The sentry reports any detected, 
classified or identified unit to the command centre, which, in 
turn, decides how to proceed. In addition, the camp is 
protected by armored motorized ground patrols. 
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Figure1: Camp protection scenario
In case any opponents were classified or identified by the 
UAV, a  heavily protected and armored convoy will be sent out 
to patrol the area. If no enemies were detected, only a slightly 
protected convoy will be sent out.
The attackers, in turn, hide in a forest right next to the 
convoy's patrol route.
In two different scenario vignettes we distinguish 
whether the attackers do have a scout reporting in advance 
when the UAV or convoy approximates the attacker or 
whether they don't. If it's the case, the attackers may better 
hide and therefore detection becomes much more difficult.
Depending on the scenario setup (and the user-defined 
agent behavior), the blue forces will fight the detected red 
entities as soon as they were classified or wait for an 
identification.
TEAM ACTIVITIES
What we are interested in, is if the attackers may be detected 
early enough and defeated so that any blue losses can be 
avoided.
Though, firstly, we wanted to compare the performance 
of different available infrared systems regarding the overall 
mission success and secondly, we were looking at the 
significance of NCO-aspects. Do the red forces profit from 
their scout?  How does the reconnaissance UAV affect the 
MoE?
Data Farming Experiments
We were executing a series of data farming experiments, 
looking at the following parameters:
• deploying the UAV for airborne reconnaissance: yes / 
no
• UAV speed [30m/s; 60m/s]
• existence of scout: yes / no
• time of the day: noon / midnight
• season: summer / winter
•weather: foggy / clear
•type of sensor system used by 
attackers: binoculars
•type of sensor system used by blue 
forces: binoculars / middle wave 
infrared device 1 and 2 / long wave 
infrared device
As MoEs we were mainly looking at 
the damage state of the blue and red 
forces and the detection / 
classification / identification times 
and distances
All of our experiments were 
successfully executed on the 32node 
German cluster owned by BWB.
Data Farming Results
In a first analysis we distinguished 
between day and night and summer 
and winter times. 
There were hardly any differences 
between summer and winter, but, as expected, at night it is 
advisable to use infrared devices. The long wave and 
uncooled infrared device 3 performs best (see figure 3). 
Figure 3: Comparing the detection times 
of different sensors
In a  second analysis, we distinguished between foggy 
weather and clear sky and the existence of a scout or not. 
Since the use of infrared devices is not affected by fog, the 
following figure 4 only shows the detection distances when 
binoculars are used.
We could observe that the existence of the attackers' scout 
actually leads to higher blue losses (see figure 5). The reason 
for that is that due to the existence of the scout, the attackers 
can better hide within the forest. Therefore it's much harder to 
detect them. And if the UAV couldn't perceive them, the 
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Figure 2: IDFW18 Basecase scenario
lightly armored convoy is sent out and of course stronger 
damaged.
Figure 4: Comparing the binoculars performance 
for foggy weather and clear sky.
Figure 5: Attackers profit from scout
Finally, we compared the deployed sensor systems with 
regard to the overall mission success (avoiding any blue 
losses). Use of infrared devices seems to be rather 
counterproductive in the daytime. At night, however, again 
infrared device 3 performs best.
Figure 6: The sensors' performance regarding 
the overall mission success
SUMMARY AND WAY AHEAD
Overall we are happy, the model itself works very well. We 
succeeded in setting up an interesting scenario during the 
week. Analyses of the conducted data farming experiments 
showed that the results are consistent with our expectations 
and understanding of the real world scenario. 
We succeeded in verifying the modeling approach we 
chose for physically modeling electro-optical sensors and 
direct fire weapons. With the implemented optical sensors, the 
terrain features and atmospheric conditions are adequately 
considered.
Despite the more advanced features ABSEM version 0.2 
contains by now, the model performance is still  more than 
sufficient for  ABSEM being used within the data farming 
process. 
 In future activities we first of all want to extend and 
complete the effector modeling taking into account indirect 
fire. Furthermore we plan to integrate radar systems.
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Figure 1: Team Members
INTRODUCTION & MISSION
The Bundeswehr Transformation Center is exploring 
concepts how M&S can effectively support CD&E projects 
related to Peace Support Operations (PSO). Human Factors 
and Human Behavior analyses have shown to be highly 
relevant in this context. One study specifically examines 
possibilities to model a PSO with PAX in which military is 
tasked to assist in building and operating refugee camps, 
and especially to ensure order and security. PAX is to be 
used to support decision makers in assessing and evaluating 
TTP (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures) and ROE (Rules of 
engagement). Therefore, a high degree of validity in the 
model and data is required.
Since IDFW17, PAX has changed significantly, including a 
revised tactical behavior of the soldiers,  adjustments to other 
major model effects and a 3-dimensional simulation and 
visualization.
The team's primary goal during IDFW18 was to calibrate 
selected parameters in order to achieve a realistic behavior of 
the soldier agents with a specific focus on ROE. This 
calibration follows the methodology developed at IDFW17 
and prepares the validation of the new soldier agent model in 
PAX. Underlying questions for investigation are:
1. Are the ROE effective for the military and the given 
mission of operating a refugee camp?
2. Can a secure environment for both refugees and 
camp operators, e.g. military, NGO, be established 
by applying these ROE?
The team's mission at IDFW18 was as follows:
Calibrate the simulation inputs so that the  target ranges of  the 
MOE derived from the underlying ROE are achieved.
SCENARIO
The team examined a situation in the refugee camp where 
members of one group (B) have already received food 
packages and are heading back to their tents. Members of 
another group (A) do not have their rations yet and attempt 
to steal packages from B.
Figure 2: Examined situation in the refugee camp scenario
Two vignettes ("micro scenarios") were chosen as the 
basis for calibration, referred to as the low-escalation vignette 
and the high-escalation vignette. In the low-escalation 
vignette a civilian CivA1 from Group A verbally threatens 
civilian CivB in order to obtain his packages. A soldier 
witnessing the threats tries to stop the packages being stolen 
and to prevent escalation of the situation while obeying the 
ROE, the relevant extract of which is shown in Figure 3. In the 
high-escalation vignette, CivA1 attacks CivB with a knife in 
order to obtain the food as opposed to a verbal threat.
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CALIBRATION METHODOLOGY
Usually, we define calibration of a simulation model as an 
iterative process comprising two main activities: comparing 
the model to the real system and making adjustments to 
reduce  ascertained discrepancies.
Due to a lack of "real system data", however, the team 
was relying on subject matter expert (SME) opinion as to what 
should happen in a particular situation. For this reason, it was 
desirable to perform the calibration on a very small scale 
situation.
The calibration of these vignettes was done in several 
phases1:
• Pre-experimental phase: Determine and classify input 
factors, define the desired MOEs and identify related 
model output factors.
• Develop understanding end exclude unrealistic 
settings: Evaluate the model and scenario doing broad 
range experiments.
• Calibration: Achieve realistic MOEs by adjusting 
input factors or even the model itself.
STUDIES & ANALYSIS
Pre-Experimental Phase
The most important step of the pre-experimental phase was 
to define the MOEs. The refugee camp scenario can be 
declared as calibrated when the MOEs, which were 
determined by SMEs, are met (see Table 1). For example, 
Table 1 indicates that the SME expectation was that in the 
low-escalation vignette the soldier would successfully 
prevent the packages from being stolen in more than 90% of 
the cases.
During team discussions, the inputs of interest in the 
refugee model were found to fall into one of three categories. 
Internal factors are those which are to be calibrated to fixed 
values2. Advanced factors are psychological and behavior 
traits, which should be recalibrated by a model expert for 
each scenario and should not usually be visible to the OR 
analyst. Model variables are those input factors which will be 
varied by the OR analyst in the specific scenario. Thus the 
calibration goal for the model variables is to identify valid 
variable ranges to be used by the OR analyst. Examples of 




Soldier's success in preventing stealing > 90%
Use of weapons by CivA1 0%
Use of weapons by Soldier 0%
High-escalation vignette
Soldier's success in preventing stealing ≥ 90%
Soldier's success in preventing subsequent 
attacks ≥ 90%
Table 1: MOEs and respective calibration goals
Develop Understanding and Exclude 
Unrealistic Settings
The goal of this phase was to develop a better functional 
understanding of the behavior of the scenario and to narrow 
down the ranges of all factors to reasonable intervals. For 
this purpose, several broad range experiments were done on 
a Data Farming cluster. One of the results, for example, was 
the finding of an appropriate level of the threshold below 
which a motive is considered irrelevant in the PAX behavior 
model (see second parameter in Table 2). This was found 
through a regression tree analysis of the results of one 
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1  These phases are intended as a guideline only, with the possibility to add, skip or repeat single phases or steps as necessary.
2  Note that in the case of PAX, this requires a combined effort of model experts, psychologists and SMEs.
Figure 3: Soldier's ROE when defending another agent
experiment and a visual study of unexpected model results 
via animation and graphs of human emotions over time. 
Calibration Phase
The calibration phase encompasses the actual comparison of 
the experiments to the MOEs defined through subject matter 
expertise as well as adjustments to reduce  ascertained 
discrepancies.
For this purpose, an NOLH design with 15 factors was 
created and run for each vignette, based on the experiments in 
the previous phase and the parameters and ranges finally 
selected. Table 2 exemplarily depicts a selection of those 
parameters with their respective value or parameter range.
Model factor Category Range in NOLH DoE
Thresh. insignificance of a motive Internal fixed to 20
Persuasiveness of attacks Advanced fixed to 100
Thresh. for handing over package Internal fixed to 2
Persuasiveness of pacifying Advanced [20;50]
Persuasiveness of threats Advanced [30;60]
Civilians' anger factor Variable [0.01;0.3]
Civilians' arousal factor Variable [1.0;3.0]
Table 2: Categorization of parameters and their ranges in the 
NOLH design of calibration experiment Exp 01
Figure 4: Detailed analysis of a single run in PAX3D GUI
The results from the first calibration experiment (Exp 01) 
are presented in Table 3. Exp 01 indicated a straight success 
for the high-escalation vignette – MOEs achieved and 
calibration declared.
Exp 01 for the low-escalation vignette resulted in a 
surprise: the soldier performed extremely poorly in 
preventing CivA1 from stealing the packages of CivB. More 
precisely, he was successful in only 3% of the cases! Analysis 
of the results indicated that this was due to the factor 
threshold for handing over package, which was subsequently 
fixed to a  value of 1 for Exp 02. While this re-calibration 
already resulted in an improvement to 43% (see Table 3), 
further investigation warranted changes on the 
implementation side that are needed to handle this particular 
type of situation.
MOE Goal Exp 01 Exp 02
Low-escalation vignette
Soldier's success in preventing stealing > 90% 3.01% 43.26%
Use of weapons by CivA1 0% 0% 0%
Use of weapons by soldier 0% 0% 0%
High-escalation vignette
Soldier's success in preventing stealing ≥ 90% 95.29% -
Soldier's success in preventing 
subsequent attacks ≥ 90% 97.64% -
Table 3: Calibration results
The team also studied the animation for several  single 
runs (see Figure 4) and tracked behavior variables as a 
function of time to verify that the calibration results were not 
achieved arbitrarily or due to random effects.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The two main outcomes of the week were the further 
refinement of the calibration methodology defined at 
IDFW17 and a partly calibration of the new PAX3D model 
with a focus on the new soldier agent model.
The main objective of the workshop was to calibrate the 
simulation inputs so that the MOE thresholds derived from 
the underlying ROE are achieved. This could be achieved for 
the high escalation vignette. Analyzing the low escalation 
vignette, the team discovered that the model has to be 
adapted with respect to underlying parameters. In summary, 
there was high confidence that the ROE basically were 
executed properly.
The distinction of the model factors into three categories 
– internal, advanced and variable – in the preparation phase 
makes the calibration process more targeted since the 
different types of parameters need different types of 
calibration as well: Internal factors are the "deepest" in the 
model and are to be calibrated to fixed values, ideally never 
touched again. Advanced factors are also calibrated to fixed 
values or ranges, but based on the scenario and thus 
requiring recalibration when the scenario changes. The 
variable factors finally represent the parameters visible and 
available to the OR analyst and should be calibrated to a 
reasonable range depending on the scenario. This 
categorization is considered an important finding of the 
workshop and an essential step for future calibration work.
To sum up, the general  methodology defined and the 
calibration performed especially with the new soldier agent 
model and scenario during IDFW18 lay the foundation for the 
validation and application of PAX3D.
Finally, the interdisciplinary, international and 
collaborative atmosphere during IDFW18 again guaranteed 
great work with valuable results! Special thanks to all  team 
members for bringing in their expertise, work and time 
during the week – and fun!
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Team 6: Data Farming in 
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INTRODUCTION
There is a need to conduct testing in a complex joint mission 
environment across the acquisition life cycle to improve a 
program manager's ability to deliver joint capabilities to 
warfighters. For a joint mission environment with many 
interdependent systems, assessing individual system and 
system-of-systems (SoS) contributions to joint mission 
effectiveness becomes extremely challenging. A change in 
one system may have cascading effects across the mission 
environment and, furthermore, many of these systems may 
be at different points in development and acquisition. This 
complex adaptive SoS environment makes it nearly 
impossible to plan efficient tests using current test 
methods and capabilities. Cogent planning for the 
tests of these complex adaptive systems involves a 
very tedious, almost impossible, test planning 
process for determining what and how exactly to 
test. To do this efficiently, new test and evaluation 
(T&E) tools, methods, and processes are needed and 
data farming has been identified as one tool that 
may help in this process.
For this workshop, our team continued work in 
exploring the use of data farming in the netcentric 
systems test planning process. Our objectives were to:
• Continue to gain a fuller understanding of the 
challenges in planning Netcentric Systems 
Tests;
• Continue to explore areas in Netcentric 
Systems Tests where data farming may be 
complementary to other techniques and tools;
• Continue to gain an appreciation for the state-
of-the-art experimental design techniques and 
algorithms for exploring a large possibilities 
landscape; and,
• Test the capability of our prototype JTEAM 
(Joint Test and Evaluation Agent Model) 
framework in data farming a Joint Fires Scenario, 
focusing on the C2 system parameters. The scenario 
was developed to support the InterTEC 
(Interoperability Test and Evaluation Capability) 
Spiral 2 System Integration Test Plan (STIP).
To guide our discussion, as well as illustrate the data 
farming process, we conducted two notional experiments 
using a standard Nearly-Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
(NOLH) design and a newer Resolution VII Fractional 
Factorial (R7FF) design. The system-of-systems under 
consideration in these experiments was based on a Time-
Sensitive Target (TST) scenario vignette, which was partially 
implemented in JTEAM prior to the workshop, and a subset 
of the larger Joint Fires scenario. The next sections give a brief 
overview of the scenario, the JTEAM simulation, the 
experiments, and their resulting analyses. The article 
concludes with a summary and discussion of our future work.
SCENARIO
The scenario was a simplified variation of the TST vignette 
that was developed to support the InterTEC (Interoperability 
Test and Evaluation Capability) Spiral 2 System Integration 
Test Plan (STIP). On the Red side, the TST is a Red Convoy 
moving down a road. Protecting the convoy is a Red Air-Air 
(RedAA) aircraft, equipped with an Air-Air missile, 
providing defense against Blue's aircraft. On the Blue side, 
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Figure 1: Use Case Scenario
there is a Blue Sensor (ground) that can 
detect and track the Red Convoy; a Blue 
Air-Air aircraft (BlueAA), equipped with 
a Blue Air-Air missile; a Blue Air-Ground 
(BlueAG) aircraft, equipped with a Blue 
Air-Ground missile; a Blue AirSensor that 
can detect the Red Air-Air aircraft; and a 
Blue AOC (Air Operations Center), which 
makes decisions on which resource to 
attack the TST. The scenario laydown is 
shown in Figure 1.
The scenario proceeds as follows: the 
Red Convoy begins moving down the road 
at simulation start; when within range of 
the Blue Sensor, the Blue Sensor sends a 
Call For Fire message to the Blue AOC; the 
Blue AOC decides which resource to send 
based on target priority, resource 
availability, weapon matching and fires 
area deconfliction, and sends a message to 
the first matching resource to conduct the 
mission. For this example, the only 
resource available is the BlueAG aircraft, 
which then proceeds to the target location 
indicated in the Call  for Fire message. 
When nearing the TST (based on onboard 
sensor range), the BlueAG aircraft launches its AG missile and 
returns to its base. 
Happening concurrently is a similar process on the Air-
Air side. When the Blue AirSensor detects the RedAA, it 
determines which resource is available to attack that target 
(similar to the AG situation, the Blue AA is the only Anti-AA 
resource), and sends a message to the BlueAA to proceed to 
the target location. When the BlueAA nears the RedAA, it 
launches its AA missile. If the RedAA sensor's range is 
sufficient, it can also detect the Blue AA and launch its Red 
AA missile. Mission success is based on whether or not the 
Red Convoy is destroyed.
In the current implementation, the Air and Ground 
interactions are independent, e.g., the Blue AG can proceed to 
its target though the Red AA may still be a threat. Future work 
will focus on integrating these aspects.
JTEAM OVERVIEW
JTEAM (Joint Test and Evaluation Agent Model) is a 
prototype Agent-based simulation being developed as part 
of the JMEDF (Joint Mission Effectiveness support using 
Data Farming) project, supporting the Netcentric Systems 
Test Program. The goal of JTEAM is to help test designers in 
developing test designs for joint systems of systems tests by 
providing an easy-to-use, fast-running tool, and combined 
with state-of-the-art experimental design techniques, to 
explore a wide variety of test scenarios.
JTEAM is a discrete-event, three-dimensional, farmable 
agent-based model built on top of a composable and 
extensible framework. Farmability of the model enhances 
computational experiments by allowing users to easily vary 
input parameters associated with the agents. Composability 
allows users to build up or construct agents using software 
components specific to the domain. Extensibility allows users 
to develop their own software components to extend 
functionality provided by the basic framework. 
The JTEAM model is composed of a collection of agents 
and an underlying world model where the agents interact, 
which currently is a 3-dimensional spatial world with flat 
terrain. Each Agent has a basic structure that is common to all 
agents, with functionality added by including specific 
Decider, Effector and Perceiver components. In addition to 
these components, Agent’s have a name, a side, an 
observableClass, and a targetClass, all of which can be set to 
arbitrary values. Finally, Agent’s have a PropertyHandler that 
can handle a set of user-defined properties (through 
Effectors). The agents, and their components, are specified in 
an XML-formatted scenario file.
Each Decider, Effector, and Perceiver can have a set of 
farmable parameters associated with that component. 
Common structure includes communications, action, effector, 
damage, and perception handling mechanisms, and common 
properties such as target and observable class. 
As depicted in Figure 2, each agent can have one or more 
Effectors, one or more Actions, one or more Perceivers, one 
Decider, and a Perceptions or “knowledge” base, which is a 
collection of Percepts that characterize the Agent’s situational 
awareness.  
Briefly, Effectors provide the Agent a means to observe 
or influence its external environment, through Actions, such 
as sensing, movement, or shooting. Effectors also provide 
Percepts, which are placed in the Perceptions base to be used 
by other Effectors or Perceivers. The Agent’s set of Percepts 
constitutes what the Agent “knows” about the environment 
and itself. Perceivers work with Percepts in the Perceptions 
base, and provide additional, sometimes “higher-level” 
Percepts, or by filtering and removing Percepts to model such 
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Figure 2: JTEAM Agent Structure
things as memory or operator overload. A Decider then uses 
those Percepts to “decide” on the set of Actions to take, and 
tasks the Effectors to carry out those Actions.
JTEAM is written in the Java language and uses the 
MASON agent-based modeling framework (specifically 
version 12) for its underlying simulation infrastructure, in 
addition to a number of other supporting open source 
packages that provide additional functionality.
Farming Parameters Min Max
Blue Sensor call for fire out process time 5 sec 30 sec
Blue Sensor comm link reliability 0.7 1
Blue Sensor sensor range 2 km 10 km
Blue Sensor probability of detection Red 
Convoy 0.7 1
Blue AOC call for fire in process time 5 sec 30 sec
Blue AOC comm link reliability 0.7 1
Blue AOC decision time 30 sec 2 min
Blue AOC range of the Blue AG resource 10 km 300 km
Blue AirSensor call for OCA out processing 
time 5 sec 30 sec
Blue AirSensor OCA out processing time 5 sec 30 sec
Blue AirSensor sensor range 200 km 400 km
Blue AirSensor probability of detection for 
Red AA 0.7 1
Blue AirSensor decision time for the 
mission 30 sec 2 min
Blue AirSensor range of the Blue AA 
resource 100 km 300 km
Blue AA OCA in process time 5 sec 30 sec
Blue AA speed 280 m/s 320 m/s
Blue AG JFIRES in process time 5 sec 30 sec
Blue AG speed 250 m/s 280 m/s
Red AA speed 280 m/s 320 m/s
Red Convoy speed 10 m/s 20 m/s
Blue AAM  pk 0.8 1
Blue AAM  speed 700 m/s 750 m/s
Red AAM pk 0.8 1
Red AAM speed 700 m/s 750 m/s
Blue AGM  pk 0.8 1
Blue AGM  speed 280 m/s 320 m/s
Table 1: Data Farming Parameters
DISCUSSION AND EXPERIMENTS
The group discussed several areas where data farming could 
potentially be useful in the Net-centric systems test planning 
process. The group also became more familiar  with the NST 
planning process in order to understand where the 
challenges lie. The team used JTEAM with the TST scenario 
and focused on the associated C2 parameters, particularly 
time to make a decision as to what asset or platform to 
assign to the TST based on a priori known capabilities of the 
Blue agents.
Using a modified version of the initial TST scenario, the 
team developed a list of 65 potential factors that could be used 
in a design of experiments (DOE). In order to use the standard 
NOLH, in addition to one of the newer designs, we down 
selected from 65 factors to 26 factors. We then picked 
minimum and maximum values that seemed reasonable 
given the construct of the scenario. The parameters and their 
minimum and maximum values are listed in Table 1. We 
constructed a 26 factor NOLH of 257 design points, and ran 
JTEAM on the new SEED cluster, reaper, using 30 replications 
for each design point. We then conducted an initial analysis, 
demonstrating to the team members the types of analysis and 
information that can be obtained using primarily regression 
trees. Our primary MOE was the mean time to kill the convoy.  
Following the NOLH runs, we generated a 26 factor, 
Resolution VII Fractional Factorial (R7FF) design, which 
resulted in 16384 design points. The R7FF is one of the new 
designs developed as part of the JMEDF project. We ran this 
experiment, again using reaper, with 5 replications for each 
design point. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Our initial analysis using the 26 factor NOLH indicated that 
the AOC decision time was the most important factor, which 
was the factor the group "guessed right". Also, the mean 
time to kill was close to the "actual" 10 minutes, i.e., the time 
observed during the actual field test. However, while 
conducting the analysis using data from R7FF runs, we 
noticed that the initial  NOLH results did not include output 
from the runs where the Red Convoy was not killed; the Red 
Convoy had survived 66% of the time. When the analysis 
was conducted by reweighing the effects of the non-kills, the 
AOC decision time was no longer a factor  in any of the 
statistical models. 
The results for  the probability of kill  for the TST ranged 
from completely ineffective to nearly perfect with just a few 
factors and splits of the regression tree, as can be seen in 
Figure 3. Similar results were obtained for the mean Time To 
Kill  MOE. It appears that further work will be needed in 
JTEAM post-processing tools to capture the relevant output 
data more effectively!
FUTURE WORK
One of our objectives for the workshop was to arrive at a 
way forward for the project. After discussion and seeing 
what data farming could do, the group decided on several 
items to accomplish by the end of year review, which is to 
occur this September. The tasks that lie ahead include:
1. Implementing a sequential design, such as the 
R7FF, so that it could be used by lay persons.
2. Implement a JTEAM Decider component that 
would focus on modeling some aspect of the AOC.
3. Expand the scenario to incorporate other agents 
and complex decision-making for the AOC agent.
4. Include the Decider component as a factor in the 
upcoming analyses.
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SUMMARY
To accomplish our workshop objectives, our team conducted 
two notional data  farming experiments in order to gain a 
better understanding of the potential applications of the data 
farming process, techniques and tools to the test planning 
process. We used a TST scenario, implemented in our 
prototype JTEAM model, and made over 89,000 runs, using 
both a standard NOLH design and one of the newer R7FF 
designs. We conducted an analysis of that data, illustrating 
several standard analysis products. Finally, we discussed the 
way forward for our project’s end of year review.
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Figure 3- Partition tree for P(Kill)
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Tuesday
Data Farming for New Members – Gary Horne
Data Farming Tools – Steve Upton and Ted Meyer
MANA – Michael Lauren
Pythagoras – Edd Bitinas, Donna Middleton, Brittlea 
Sheldon
Wednesday
Design of Experiments and Paul Sanchez – Susan 
Sanchez, Tom Lucas and Paul Sanchez
Comparing Designs for Simulation Experiments 
– Rachel Johnson
Demo of Automated Co-evolution Framework – 
Spencer Low and Ng Ee Chong
NATO Data Farming Exploratory Effort – Gary 
Horne and Susan Sanchez
Thursday
Update on efforts to model human intangibles – 
Sim Mong Soon and Spencer Low
Influence of individual differences on vigilance 
performance – Evania Tan
Modeling Urban Insurgencies Using Systems 
Dynamics Methods – Anna Gordon
Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Indirect Fire 
Systems – Esa Lappi
Exploring the use of UAVs and other Assets in 
Border Protection – Bahri Yildiz
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INTRODUCTION
Koti ei ole koti ilman saunaa.
- Finnish Proverb
The focus for Team 7 at IDFW 18 was the investigation of 
modeling requirements for simulating mass-casualty 
disaster response scenarios and the investigation of how 
existing simulation packages could meet these requirements. 
We began with a brainstorming session of possible events 
that could result in mass-casualty disaster situations. To 
provide a framework for our thinking, we developed a basic 
scenario to consider while discussing what types of features 
a modeling software package would need to have to build a 
useful simulation model for this type of scenario. This 
discussion inherently included consideration of both the 
discrete-event simulation (DES) and the agent-based 
simulation (ABS) methodologies. The list of features was 
used to evaluate several simulation software packages for 
suitability. Next, details were specified for the scenario and 
team members attempted to build simulation models using 
four different packages: Arena, NetLogo, Pythagoras and 
Sandis. In addition, we interviewed experts in additional 
packages:  MANA, PAX, and Extend.  With the results of this 
investigation and experience, we drew some conclusions 
about simulation modeling of mass-casualty disaster 
response scenarios.
MASS-CASUALTY DISASTERS
For the purposes of our investigation, we defined a mass-
casualty disaster as some event that resulted in a number of 
victims that exceeded the number of responders. Our 
brainstormed list of potential events that could result in a 





• Auto / bus crash
• Plane crash
• Explosion
• Chemical release / spill
• Biological release
• Fire
Each of these disaster events has different characteristics 
that will affect the modeling features a simulation package 
must have to be able to model a scenario of that type. 
Therefore, we generated a  list of dimensions that would cover 
the primary characteristics of a mass-casualty disaster 
scenario.
Dimensions of Scenario Characteristics
• Disaster time frame:
o Time span (minutes, hours, days)
o After disaster cause has finished, as disaster cause 
is continuing, or both
• Physical area
o Dispersion of victims
o Traversability of terrain




 continued threat due to attack or continued 
cause of disaster 
• Size and severity
o Number of victims
o Distribution of injury severity level
• Responder characteristics
o Authority structure(s)
o Number and skill level of responding individuals
o Number and type of responding equipment / 
vehicles
o Prior plans in place / drills done
• Scope of focus
o On-site treatment
o Evacuation
o Medical facility management
o Combination of above
Recognizing that we would have difficulty evaluating the 
software packages for their usefulness in modeling all 
characteristics on all dimensions, we defined a specific 
scenario to consider. 
Specific Scenario Chosen
We chose to consider a four-car passenger train crash in a 
small town with a city nearby. The scenario begins 
immediately after the crash so there is no on-going disaster 
event. The accident scene is considered safe and the area 
traversable but some of the victims are trapped and will 
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need to be extricated. There are 200 passenger victims with 
varying injury levels, either still in the train or within the 
immediate vicinity.
The responding organization has a  clearly defined 
authority structure with an established response plan so there 
are no inter-organizational issues to be modeled. There are 
responders with medical skills as well as unskilled volunteers 
and an extrication team with necessary equipment. Three 
ambulances will be available to transport victims to a  local 
hospital and seven ambulances will be able to transport the 
most severe victims from the local to the city hospital.
The Measure of Effectiveness (MoE) chosen was the 
change in the distribution of victim injury levels from the 
initial injury distribution to the injury distribution at the end 
of the scenario (when all patients were treated and released, 
had died, or remained at the city hospital). The scope of the 
focus would be on-site treatment as well as evacuation and 
medical facility management. On-site activities are the triage 
of victims, the extrication of trapped victims, the movement of 
victims from their initial locations to a common location, 
stabilization of the patients, transportation of victims to the 
local hospital, and transportation to the city hospital. Over 
time, the injury levels of the victims become more severe, but 
when some type of care is given, the injury levels improve. 
Other necessary parameters for initial injury level 
distributions, injury degradation functions and improvement 
jumps, number and arrival times of resources, travel times, 
etc. were chosen later to facilitate actual model construction.
SIMULATION METHODOLOGY AND 
SOFTWARE EVALUATION
We chose to evaluate several different software packages for 
their suitability for modeling this type of scenario. These 
packages included ones primarily developed for DES 
modeling and ones primarily developed for ABS modeling. 
To have a general terminology, we used the term “agent” to 
refer to entities, resources, or agents wherever possible. The 
full list of software packages we were able to consider 
included: Arena, Extend, MANA, NetLogo, PAX, Pythagoras 
and Sandis.  
Required Features
When considering our scenario, we developed a list of 
features or modeling capabilities necessary for building an 
effective model. These included:
• tracking of location of agents
• tracking of continuous changes in injury level
• agents having different roles
• agents moving together (e.g. a  worker carrying a 
victim)
• agents able to perform more than one task
• modeling of processes that require specific 
combinations of agents and take time
In addition, we realized that our basic scenario did not 
explicitly appear to require certain features, but these features 
would increase the usefulness of a model of this scenario. 
These include:
• communications to increase the number of available 
agents or to redirect agents
• human-in-the-loop capabilities
When evaluating the software packages, it did become 
clear that our scenario description was biased towards DES 
methodology. Therefore, Arena and Extend seemed to be a 
better fit, with Extend being a little better due to the ability to 
explicitly track and animate agent coordinates. However, for 
more realistic modeling of the scenario we would likely want 
to use agent-based features such as behavior changes based 
on internal states of the agents. In addition, investigation of 
important response organization coordination issues would 
require the ability to model agent interactions. With this 
consideration in mind, the ABS packages became more 
attractive. To further investigate a few of the most promising 
packages, we chose to try to build a simulation model for the 
scenario in each of four different packages: Arena, NetLogo, 
Pythagoras and Sandis.
Model Construction
Attempting to build a model for the scenario in each 
different software package simultaneously was informative. 
We experienced unexpected challenges, found an occasional 
bug, and sometimes were surprised at how we could use the 
existing features in a package to model something that the 
software wasn’t designed for. The experiences of each 
member working on a different model are described below.
Arena
Modeling this scenario in Arena initially seemed to be an 
easy proposition, since several sequential processes needed 
to be modeled and this is what Arena was designed for. 
However, the modeling became more complicated when 
trying to model the changing injury levels for each victim. 
Arena seems to have some ability to track continuous 
variables but it is not readily apparent, so the model was 
designed to update the injury level information for a  victim 
each time it received treatment. This, however, means that 
the injury levels are not really continuously tracked and 
acted upon. In addition, it was determined that an agent 
performing triage should always move to the next closest 
victim agent. Since Arena does not provide any mapping 
capability, the coordinates of each agent had to be  recorded 
as attributes. Each time a worker agent needed to move to 
another victim, the queue of victims had to be iteratively 
searched, with each distance recalculated, to find the next 
closest victim. Further modeling was needed to delay for the 
correct travel time and update the worker’s coordinates. This 
was a cumbersome way to consider locations in Arena. 
Overall, Arena handles basic processing well, but is not able 
to easily accommodate the more complex aspects of the 
scenario.
NetLogo
NetLogo is a free, agent-based simulation development 
environment based on Logo, a computer language designed 
for ease of programming.  No one on the team had previous 
NetLogo experience, but the team was able to build enough 
of a model to ascertain the capabilities of this language and 
environment.
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Unlike the other tools tested, NetLogo does not provide a 
graphical programming environment; rather, it is purely 
coded in a high-level language.  Nevertheless, the language 
has several features well suited to the chosen scenario. 
Figure 1. NetLogo train crash simulation in start position. Yellow 
truck “turtle” represents ambulance starting location.  Sliders 
control simulation parameters.
NetLogo agents are called “turtles” and they can interact 
through explicit links.  The programmer is able to define 
types of agents (“breeds”) - for our scenario the passengers, 
medical personnel, and vehicles were all  different types. 
Different sets of attributes could be defined for each type of 
agent, such as the health state for the passengers or the 
number of passengers assigned to each transport vehicle. 
NetLogo also has the ability to change agent types (for 
example, passengers who become volunteers), and to collect 
summary statistics on subsets of agents (“agentsets”) to be 
used for decision-making (for example, don’t send an 
ambulance to the accident site if there are no passengers 
needing transport).
NetLogo does not appear to have a  good capability for 
travel via  specified paths (i.e., roads); we were able to assume 
straight line paths in this case, but additional logic would be 
necessary for turtles to follow a line.  NetLogo can import a 
graphic map and assign color values to map coordinates; this 
may allow agents to stay within certain boundaries (for 
example, the transport area).
Pythagoras
Pythagoras has various features that provide an advantage 
in modeling a disaster scenario. As stated previously, in the 
initial  discussion the scenario set-up was biased towards 
DES methodology, which would involve a package such as 
Arena.  Therefore, some of the data we chose for the scenario 
had to be interpreted into a form more suitable for 
Pythagoras.
Pythagoras agents have the ability to interact amongst 
each other as well as be affected by the environment.  These 
two capabilities allow for a  model to show the scene of a train 
crash with the communication between volunteers and 
victims, as well as the challenges of getting through the 
debris.
The Terrain feature can model the visibility and mobility 
challenges faced at the site of the crash.  The terrain may slow 
agents down, so that it is more difficult for the volunteers to 
reach the victims.  Communication devices can show the 
unique interactions amongst agents.  Agents may also be set 
with leadership properties to create an organized response 
system.  Agent attributes may be used to show the level of an 
agent’s injury, with recurring changes each time step.  Agent 
triggers may cause a change in agent behavior due to an 
altered state.  (For example, if an agent’s health improves to a 
certain level, it may be redirected to a different location).
Pythagoras is not set up to model queuing type processes 
as in Arena.  Although it can be used to convey these 
concepts, it is in most cases better to use Arena if the interest 
only lies in modeling processing.  However, Pythagoras 
would allow for a more detailed analysis of interactions 
between agents and the challenges faced in a disaster 
response environment.
Sandis
Only the medical  evacuation model of the Sandis tool was 
used for this scenario. In general, the input of the Sandis tool 
is 1) weapon and communication characteristics, 2) units and 
their weapons, 3) fault logic for  units and operation success, 
4) geographical map, and 5) user actions for units in 
company or platoon level. 
The output is 1) the operation success probability for each 
minute time step, 2) the probability of being beaten for each 
unit, 3) unit strength distributions, 4) average combat losses 
and the killer-victim scoreboard, 5) ammunition consumption, 
6) radio network availability, and 7) medical evacuation 
logistics and treatment capacity analysis.
In the medical evacuation model of Sandis, the victims 
are grouped into four categories: minor injury, mid-state 
injury, major (critical) injury, and dead or hopeless. This 
classification system is based on triage classes.
Medical units are grouped in either connection type 
evacuation units or treatment units. Every medical treatment 
unit has three slots for the classes of combat casualties: 1) 
waiting for treatment, 2) in treatment, and 3) waiting 
transport to the next level. The medical unit’s parameters are 
the number of patients it could handle for each level of injury 
and average treatment time. A queue forms, if the number of 
wounded exceeds the capacity of the treatment unit or the 
capacity of the evacuation unit transporting the wounded to 
the next level of treatment. Evacuation connections have 
parameters for transporting time and number of wounded 
the connection can transfer.  
Figure 2. Sandis train crash simulation in start position. Casualties 
in units with green push pins.
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There are state transition parameters for wounds getting 
worse without treatment during the evacuation and 
treatment process. Thus the difference in number of dead can 
be compared with different evacuation alternatives. The 
distribution of casualties in four triage categories was easily 
created using the “divine hand” weapon. The medical units 
were modeled as military squads or platoons with medics 
and vehicles. Their ability to give treatment was given as a 
parameter value. The average values of casualty flows and 
treatment facilities could be modeled. 
The trapped victims were modeled as a separate group. 
The extrication team was modeled as a treatment unit with 
the average treatment time set to the average time for freeing 
a victim.   
Figure 3. Medical units are at the train and connections from train 
to triage sorting area and further to medical facilities are 
operational. 
 
Figure 4. Built-in feature shows a bad queue during the simulated 
evacuation process
The transportation gave only average values, but was 
also rather easy to model. The results were shown by graphs 
and written to a data file.
The modeling difficulties lay in more detailed analysis. 
For example, the action of individual first aid workers or 
casualties is practically impossible to model using Sandis. 
Also all casualties with same triage class had the same 
statistical parameter data. 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall this team accomplished a great deal in terms of 
defining requirements for modeling mass-casualty disasters 
and evaluating a variety of simulation software packages. 
We discovered that, although different software packages 
had quite different origins and features, all of them could be 
manipulated to model the scenario well  enough to be useful. 
On the other hand, it was clear that none of the packages we 
investigated could model all aspects of the scenario well. 
Since different packages have different strengths, we 
developed some recommendations for packages to use when 
focusing on different aspects of a disaster response scenario. 
Overall we recommend:
• Arena or Extend for focusing on queueing of agents 
and resource usage and allocation 
• Pythagoras for modeling the interactions of 
individuals with others and the environment
• Sandis for focusing on evacuation routing and 
tracking triage levels most accurately
• PAX for modeling group relationships and interaction 
dynamics
In addition, we realized that ABS and DES methodologies 
each have strengths and weaknesses but may complement 
each other well. Since DES more readily models queueing and 
resource usage and allocation, a DES model of a scenario 
could be used to determine expected queueing times as victim 
agents wait for limited resources agents. These waiting time 
distributions could then be incorporated into an ABS model as 
additional delays or travel times. On the other hand, an ABS 
model could be used to see how agents are redirected to move 
toward a different goal or perform a different functions or call 
for additional resources over the course of the scenario. This 
information could then be incorporated into a DES model 
using timed triggers or probabilities to simulate this emergent 
behavior.
Since it is already well known that DES and ABS 
methodologies have different strengths, software packages are 
now available (e.g., AnyLogic), and others are under 
development, that are advertised to have both DES and ABS 
functionality. Since it is clear that effective modeling of 
disaster-response scenarios could benefit from both types of 
functionality, a next step in this research direction would be to 
evaluate these multi-purpose software packages. 
Given that no single platform can satisfy all 
requirements, one additional possibility is the development of 
a more comprehensive modeling environment that allows 
easy access to a portfolio of simulation-based platforms, 
including the ones surveyed in this report (see [Plale et al 
2005]1  for an exemplar of this approach).   This integrated 
modeling environment would ideally provide a meta-level 
interface which would aid users in configuring data sets, 
models, and solvers within one environment regardless of 
modeling approach or paradigm. 
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1 Plale, B., Gannon, G., Huang, Y., Kandaswamy, G., Pallickara, S.L., Slominski, A. 2005. Cooperating services for data-driven 
computational experimentation. Computing in Science and Engineering (7,5), 34-43.
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ITSim is a newly developed agent-based simulation 
environment designed to analyze operations within the 
broader range of tasks of the Federal Armed Forces, the 
Bundeswehr.
Modern warfare scenarios are dominated by asymmetric 
threats with complex non-linear interdependencies and 
interrelations that traditional techniques of analysis are 
insufficient to capture. For example, it is often hard to 
determine whether located humans are opponents (Red) or 
just civilians (neutral). This distinction can often only be 
made, when suspicious behavior is observed. Especially, 
when protecting a base, the response time to suspicious 
behavior is important to prevent attacks.
The investigated scenario analyses exactly that aspect by 
using 3D terrain provided by the German Armed Forces.
One of our goals is to investigate the influence of the 
given terrain. The expectation without terrain is that the red 
units can be detected as soon as they start to prepare their 
missile attack. If the terrain data base is used we expect areas 
in which the opponents cannot be detected, e.g. in a valley. 
Thus, the existence of opponents can only be determined after 
they have started the attack by detecting the trajectory. The 
second goal is to analyze the efficiency of different base 
defending strategies, which will be defined later on. 
SCENARIO
Figure 1 depicts a possible excerpt of the investigated 
scenario. A blue base is located in 3D terrain. Dark regions 
mark high terrain elevation whereas bright areas denote lower 
terrain elevation. Thus, the blue base is located on a hill. It is 
protected by four guard towers. Two additional towers 
equipped with cameras are used to observe the surrounding 
area. They are visualized by tactical icons in the upper part of 
figure 1. During the course of the scenario, some Red will 
approach the base in order to attack it with ballistic weapons. 
Depending on the strategy, a blue unit will try to prevent the 
attack as shown in figure 1. 
The key idea is that the opponents cannot be detected as 
Red until they start to prepare their attack. Thus, the whole 
approach time cannot be used to prevent the attack. After the 
configured preparation time, the opponents launch n missiles 
and flee afterwards.
Figure 1: Base in 3D terrain
The scenario’s analysis is divided into two phases. The 
first one is a static classification and the second one is a 
simulation capturing the dynamics of the strategies.
Static Classification
Before the scenario is simulated dynamically, a static 
classification is performed. Two important measures are vital 
for the strategies: ballistic threat and line-of-sight. Areas 
from which the base can be attacked by ballistic weapons are 
called ballistically threatening. The muzzle velocity of the 
weapon defines its maximal distance. The terrain defines if 
there exists an angle that results in a flight trajectory such 
that the base is hit. The line-of-sight denotes which areas can 
be observed by the cameras in the base. These cells are called 
observable. Note that both measures strongly depend on the 
given terrain: if there is none, every point inside a maximal 
sight range is visible and any point between a given minimal 
and maximal shoot range is ballistically threatening.
In order to perform the classification, the area around the 
base is gridded. Afterwards, every cell, i.e. grid element, is 
checked if it is ballistically threatening and observable. Note 
that the terrain itself is not gridded but based on precise 
vector data. According to that classification, three cases exist:  
• A cell is not ballistically threatening, i.e. the base 
cannot be attacked from that cell. The Blue don’t have 
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to worry about that cell. Therefore, the cell is colored 
green.
• A cell is ballistically threatening and not observable. 
Thus, the base can be attacked from that cell and there 
is no line-of-sight to the base. The attackers cannot be 
identified while they prepare their attack. This is the 
worst case for the blue forces and the cell is colored 
red.
• A cell is ballistically threatening and observable. Thus, 
the base can be attacked from that cell and there is a 
line-of-sight to the Blue. The attackers can be detected 
while they prepare their attack. The cell is colored 
yellow.
The result of the classification of the base-case scenario is 
depicted in figure 2. Each grid cell has an edge length of l1 m 
resulting in 12,315 cells. 38.9% of the cells are green, 26.8% 
yellow and 34.3% red. Considering the ballistically 
threatening cells, only, the majority is not observable. This 
classification is the base for the simulation.
Figure 2: Result of Classification
Simulation of the Strategies
Our second goal is to evaluate different blue strategies 
against a given red behavior. This kind of analysis may give 
interesting hints to support the defending of the base. The 
red strategy is fixed in all experiments. It consists of the 
following steps:
5. Generation: the units are generated uniformly 
distributed outside the base. Their affiliation is 
neutral, i.e. they cannot be detected as hostile.
6. Approach: a yellow or red cell (i.e. a ballistic attack 
is possible from that cell) is selected and moved to. 
The unit is still not detectable as hostile.
7. Preparation: two cases exist. If the attacker can 
detect any blue unit it gets discouraged and flees. 
Otherwise it starts to prepare its attack. From that 
point in time, it can be detected as hostile by the 
Blue. As soon as a blue force is detected by the red 
unit, it aborts its preparation and starts to flee. 
Thereby note that the cameras’ sight range is much 
higher than the one for regular ground troops 
including red attackers and blue defenders. For our 
experiments, we assume a preparing time of five 
minutes.
8. Attack: the Red starts to fire a previously defined 
number of projectiles at the base. From this point in 
time, the attacker is detected as hostile by the blue 
defenders if it has not already been. Between the 
shots, the attacker has to reload. Afterwards, it flees.
The two Measures of Effectiveness (MoE) of this scenario 
are: The primary one is the number of prevented shots at the 
base. This happens if the attacker is neutralized or 
discouraged before the attack is started. The secondary MoE is 
the number of neutralized attackers. 
Currently, the Blue have three different strategy options 
to prevent ballistic bombardment at their base:
• Pursue  from Base  (PfB): a  blue Quick Reaction Force 
(QRF) is located inside the base and pursues as well as 
attacks the Red as soon as they have been detected. 
The attacker can be observed by the cameras or they 
reveal themselves by shooting projectiles at the base.
• Camouflaged Emplacements (CE): camouflaged spotters 
are located outside the base. They can detect the Red 
but not vice versa. As soon as the red units are located, 
their position is reported to the base and the QRF 
starts the counterattack at the Red.
• Show of Forces (SoF): patrols move around the base. 
They can detect the Red and can also be detected by 
these. If any red force is located, the nearest patrol 
starts a counter attack. Note that there is no QRF in the 
base as in the other strategies. If the Red detect any 
approaching patrol, they flee.
Figure 3 shows the classification of the strategy CE, 
where two emplacements are located in the valley. The circles 
denote their maximal sight range. Many cells inside these 
circles turned yellow since they became observable. The green 
cells remain unchanged since the ballistic threat depends on 
the terrain, only. 34.2% of the cells are yellow and 26.9% red. 
This is an improvement of about eight percent. The majority 
of the ballistically threatening cells are observable by the Blue.
The initial situation of strategy SoF is as follows: two 
patrols are located in the valley. The first one patrols between 
two waypoints northward of the base. The second one patrols 
southward. The QRF is no longer inside the base, because the 
patrols can pursue and attack the Red directly.
Note that the camera towers inside the base always 
support the detection of the Red. As mentioned above, the red 
units can only be detected after they have started preparing 
their attack. The QRF has limited time to reach the attackers 
before they can fire their rockets. 
27 - IDFW 18 - Team 8
Figure 3: Classification of CE
We expect the following results having strategy PfB as 
basis for our comparison:
CE:  when the emplacements are positioned such 
that a large area becomes visible that has not 
been before (e.g. many cells turn from red to 
yellow), more attacks can be prevented since 
the QRF  can act earlier. Thus, we expect more 
success for the Blue.
SoF:   if the patrol points are selected wisely, the 
patrols can also cover many of the invisible 
cells and attack the Red earlier. Another 
advantage is that the distance from the patrol 
to the red attackers might be shorter than the 
one from the base to the Red. A third positive 
effect for Blue is that the Red might have to 
flee more often since they can detect the 
patrols by themselves and get discouraged. 
Thus, we expect this strategy to be the best.
The influence of omitting the terrain (i.e. the whole area 
being flat) on the three strategies is expected as follows:
PfB:  the success rate will rise since the red units can 
always be detected as soon as they start to 
prepare their attack. Thus, the QRF always has 
the maximum time for its reaction. Note that 
this does not necessarily mean that the attack 
can always be prevented.
CE:  this strategy will not improve the MoE of PfB 
since it only enlarges the visible area that is 
already maximal anyway (the cameras’ sight 
range is larger than the range of the red 
ballistic weapons). Thus, we expect similar 
results as for PfB.
SoF:   the advantage of the enlarged visible area 
drops since the whole area is visible.  But the 
advantage of discouraging the Red stays. 
Additionally, the approach distance to the 
attacking enemies might be shorter since the 
patrols are outside the base. Thus, we expect 
this to be the best also if the terrain is omitted.
We present the analysis of our results in the following 
section.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
As already mentioned in the introduction, we want to 
investigate two main questions during the evaluation of this 
scenario: 
• What is the influence of the terrain? 
• How effective are the different strategy options of the 
blue base defenders? 
To answer these questions, we have determined a 
primary and a  secondary MoE. The former one is the 
percentage of prevented attacks and the latter one is the 
number of neutralized attackers.
We have performed more than 170,000 simulation runs 
with different parameter variations. The variation covers the 
terrain, the velocities of the Red and Blue, as well as the 
different strategies.
Influence of the Terrain
In order to determine the terrain’s influence on our MoE, we 
have evaluated the strategy PfB with blue velocities b1, b2 
and b3 km/h as well as red velocities of r1, r2, r3 km/h, 
respectively. All nine experiments were performed with and 
without terrain resulting in 18 experiments.
Table 1 contains the results of the strategy Pursue from 
Base. We can easily confirm that both MoEs prevented shots 
and prevented all shots do not depend on the velocity of the 
Red since the variation caused by the red velocity is less than 
one percent given the blue speed. 







b1 km/h r1 km/h 21.02 % 18.14 % 57.79 %
b1 km/h r2 km/h 20.96 % 18.14 % 40.07 %
b1 km/h r3 km/h 21.02 % 18.14 % 36.89 %
b2 km/h r1 km/h 26.17 % 21.06 % 75.37 %
b2 km/h r2 km/h 26.16 % 21.05 % 53.05 %
b2 km/h r3 km/h 26.09 % 20.96 % 46.09 %
b3 km/h r1 km/h 31.10 % 25.32 % 86.21 %
b3 km/h r2 km/h 31.10 % 25.32 % 65.50 %
b3 km/h r3 km/h 31.10 % 25.32 % 51.82 %
Table 1: PfB with terrain
This can be explained by considering that a shot can only 
be prevented if the Quick Reaction Force arrives at the 
attacking unit while it is preparing its attack or if the Red 
recognizes a blue unit during its preparing phase. Clearly, the 
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former event only depends on the blue velocity while the 
latter one does not depend on any velocity. However, the red 
velocity is important for  our secondary MoE, since the 
number of neutralized attackers significantly rises when the 
Red get slower or the blue defenders become faster. The 
reason is simply the fact that more attackers are able to escape 
when they are faster.
Note the difference between prevented shots and 
prevented all shots: the former one denotes the number of 
prevented shots, whereas the latter one denotes if the base 
attack has been prevented completely throughout one 
simulation, i.e. if the red attacker has been discouraged or 
neutralized while it was preparing its attack. Thus, the latter 
one is a more strict measure. This explains why its percentage 
is less then prevented shots in all variations and strategies.





b1 km/h 48.15 % 46.85 % 84.58 %
b2 km/h 64.84 % 61.83 % 93.78 %
b3 km/h 78.76 % 74.67 % 98.29 %
Table 2: PfB without terrain
Table 2 contains the results of strategy PfB without 
terrain. Since the red attacker can be seen as soon as it starts 
to prepare its attack, the blues success is significantly 
superior. Note that this does not result from a better strategy 
itself but it is just the lack of realism that raises Blue’s success. 
The average gain factor of prevented shots and prevented all 
shots is about 2.5. The number of neutralized attackers is also 
higher in all cases than without terrain as can be seen in table 
1. We compared the influence of the terrain only with respect 
to the strategy PfB. This is sufficient since it is clear  that the 
terrain has an influence. We can quantify this influence with 
respect to our two MoEs. 
However, the terrain’s influence can also be seen by the 
static classification discussed above. If there is no terrain, 
there exists no red cell, i.e. no cell is ballistically threatening 
and not observable at the same time. The number of green 
cells decreases from 3,299 to 2,273 since all cells can be 
attacked within the given minimal and maximal range of the 
ballistic weapons (defined by its muzzle speed).  All 
remaining 10,042 cells are yellow compared to 4,215 yellow 
cells if terrain is given. Thus, the static classification also 
supports the claim that there is a significant influence of the 
terrain.
Of course, this quantification is limited to this scenario 
with this strategy. But in the real world there is terrain and we 
cannot simply omit it in data-farming since this distorts the 
analysis significantly. The results of the strategy comparison 
are presented next.
Comparison of the Strategy Options
We run the scenario with all three different strategies. 
Each run was performed with terrain and the same velocity 
settings for the units as above: b1, b2 and b3 km/h for blue 
defenders and r1, r2 and r3 km/h for red attackers. Table 1 
from above provides the results for the strategy PfB, which 









b1 km/h 23.24 % 19.00 % 54.06 %
b2 km/h 31.19 % 23.75 % 69.04 %
b3 km/h 37.89 % 29.32 % 76.26 %
Table 3: Results of strategy CE
Table 3 shows the results of the second strategy 
Camouflaged Emplacements. Similarly to PfB, the red velocity 
is not important for the MoEs prevented shots and prevented 
all shots. Due to the earlier detection in the areas that are 
covered by the spotters (see figure 3), the blue QRF can start 
earlier. Since the number of yellow cells rises from 26.8% to 
34.2% because of the additional spotter (see figures 2 and 3), 
one might expect that the primary MoE also rises by eight 
percent. This is not true. The MoE rises with respect to the 
blue velocity. If blue moves with b1 km/h, the MoEs 
prevented shots and prevented all shots rise by 2 and 0.8 
percent, respectively. When the blue speed is b2 km/h the 
MoEs rise by 5 and 2.5 percent, respectively.  The largest gain 
occurs if the blue speed is b3 km/h: 6 and 4 percent, 
respectively. The reason therefore is the distance between the 
base and the additional observable cells (see figure 3). The 
distance is so large that the QRF cannot prevent all attacks 
although it starts earlier. The faster the QRF moves, the more 
attacks can be prevented. 
The gain of strategy CE with respect to the MoE 
neutralized attackers compared to PfB is linear. Roughly 9 
percent more attackers are neutralized than with strategy PfB. 







b1 km/h r1 km/h 67.35 % 64.95 % 68.31 %
b1 km/h r2 km/h 69.22 % 66.18 % 64.01 %
b1 km/h r3 km/h 71.63 % 68.74 % 58.55 %
b2 km/h r1 km/h 73.88 % 70.81 % 67.27 %
b2 km/h r2 km/h 72.91 % 70.27 % 68.05 %
b2 km/h r3 km/h 74.84 % 72.19 % 65.28 %
b3 km/h r1 km/h 82.11 % 78.97 % 62.55 %
b3 km/h r2 km/h 78.17 % 74.88 % 69.38 %
b3 km/h r3 km/h 78.35 % 75.04 % 68.47 %
Table 4: Results of strategy SoF
The results of the last investigated strategy Show of 
Forces can be seen in table 4. First of all, we notice that the red 
velocity has influence on the MoEs prevented shots and 
prevented all shots. However, the blue velocity dominates the 
red one, i.e. the higher the blue velocity is, the superior are the 
MoEs. The faster the Blue move, the larger is the area they can 
observe in a  certain time frame. Additionally, they can reach 
an observed red attacker in shorter time. If the blue speed is 
constant, the red velocity has an influence on the MoEs, but 
there is no unambiguous trend. The reason therefore is the 
timing of the parallel movements of the red attackers and the 
blue patrols. For example, if the velocities are set such that a 
blue patrol prevents an attack by discouragement, a faster  as 
well as a slower red attacker might not be discouraged or 
might be detected later or earlier.
Another interesting result is the reason for the high 
percentages of prevented attacks. The number of attackers 
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that got discouraged before they started the preparing of their 
attack is much higher in this strategy as can be seen in table 5.




Table 5: Percentage of Prevention by Discouragement
Prevention of Discouragement denotes the percentage of 
the discouraged red attackers, i.e. the ones that detect a  blue 
immediately before starting their preparation, with respect to 
all attack preventions. This rate is low and similar  for the 
strategies PfB and CE. But it rises dramatically in strategy SoF. 
Thus, the main reason for its success is that the Red can detect 
the blue patrol and flee before they attack. Transferring this 
result to reality might become difficult since no one can count 
this number. Thus, in reality this strategy might be 
underestimated, because the correct MoE cannot be 
determined in the real world. 
Summary of the Results
Figure 5  depicts a summary of the MoE prevented all 
shots  with all strategies. Comparing PfB with terrain, CE and 
PfB without terrain, we can see that the blue velocity is more 
important if more cells can be observed. The following 
statements can be derived by our analysis:
• Terrain information has a huge impact on the 
investigated MoEs. This statement is supported by the 
static classification as well as the simulation of the 
strategy PfB. Thereby note that the strategy PfB 
without terrain has a higher MoE than PfB with terrain 
and CE. Only SoF is superior. The main reason is the 
high rate of discouraged enemies.
• Camouflaged Emplacements help to raise the success of 
the blue defenders in comparison to PfB due to an 
enlargement of the observable area. The Blue have to 
assure that these additional yellow cells can be 
reached in time by the QRF in order to realize the 
potential advantage. The impact of emplacements is 
supported by the classification and simulation.
• Show of Forces is the best strategy option. It 
outperforms all other strategies, even PfB without 
terrain. The main reason is the fact that it is able to 
discourage the attackers before they start their 
preparing.
Given these results some common hints for the defenders 
can be derived. Due to the success of SoF it might be useful to 
substitute camouflaged emplacements by visible 
emplacements that can also discourage the enemy. It is 
important to note that the number of discouraged attackers 
cannot be determined in reality. Another option is to raise the 
speed of the QRF, e.g. by using helicopters instead of ground 
troops.
Limitations of the Strategy Comparison
The performed strategy comparison is just a starting point. 
Basically, one instance of each strategy has been evaluated. 
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Figure 5: Summary of Results
This is useful if several existing strategies have to be 
compared with each other. 
With the help of the static classification, we would like to 
answer the following questions in future:
• How many emplacements are needed to cover all 
cells? 
• How can n emplacements be distributed such that 
most cells are covered? 
• What is a good ratio between covered cells and used 
emplacements?
The first question is academic since there will not be 
enough resources available in practice. But it gives an upper 
bound for the resource planning. The answer to the second 
question requires an optimization of the application of 
available resources. The third question is very interesting if 
there is a base protection to be planned. We expect a double 
bend curve if we map the emplaced units to the covered cells. 
Then, there would be a point from which any additional 
emplacement merely raises the number of observed cells.
Analogously, the answer to the following questions could 
be given using the strategy simulation:
• How many emplacements/ patrols are needed to 
avoid any attack? 
• How can n emplacements/ patrols be placed such that 
most attacks are avoided?
• What is a  good ratio between avoided attacks and 
used emplacements/ patrols?
These questions are very similar to the ones above. But 
note that their answering is much more complex since the 
dynamics (especially the movement of the Red) have to be 
captured. Additionally, a patrol cannot simply be placed at a 
certain coordinate but its waypoints related to the arrival 
times are also important.
In order to answer these questions at least semi-
automated, we have to extend our current approach with 
optimization techniques which are able to derive strategy 
settings automatically. Such a system could use evolutionary 
algorithm combined with data-farming similar to Automated 
Red Teaming (ART) and Automated Co-Evolution (ACE).
Another limitation of the performed analysis is the 
restricted variation of the parameters. We just changed the 
velocity of the units and the position of the attackers. 
Additional parameters can be varied in order to confirm the 
analysis. These parameters are sight range for the camera 
towers and standard units, number of attackers and 
defenders, initial position and waypoints of the blue patrols, 
range of the weapons of Red and Blue, duration of the attack 
preparation of the red attackers, reload time of defenders and 
attackers, number of shots of the Red before their fallback, etc. 
Considering all these parameters, the number of required 
experiments grows exponentially.
CONCLUSIONS
The presented analysis is a first approach of incorporating 
terrain information into our agent-based simulation system 
ITSim. It enables the analysis of many interesting and 
promising scenarios that might give some decision-support 
to leaders of the German Armed Forces. Especially the 
possibility to evaluate different strategies under real-world 
constraints is an enormous step into that direction.
As expected, the terrain information complicates the base 
defending task for the blue forces. But it is vital to consider all 
parameters that influence the MoE of given scenarios 
significantly. A realistic model of scenarios is important for the 
transfer of gained knowledge to the real application.
From an analytic point of view, military operations are 
highly non-linear processes in which a wide variety of factors 
can have an impact on what is going to happen. Even small-
scale decisions can have serious effects and cause an operation 
to take very different courses. The key to success is the 
appropriate modeling of the planned operation. To achieve 
this, the model must be scaled such as to generate sufficiently 
general statements that are valid for a wide range of 
operations. Thus, a satisfactory analysis of the blue strategies 
is future work since several parameters of each strategy (e.g. 
number of units, position of units/ waypoints etc.) have not 
been investigated yet. We only have analyzed one 
representative of the strategies CE and SoF, respectively, since 
only one number of units and one patrol way have been 
investigated. Note that PfB can be considered as sub-strategy 
of SoF, because there is only one patrol that is placed inside 
the base. The reason for this insufficient analysis is the 
required computing power. Over 170,000 simulation runs 
have been performed after the workshop in order to generate 
the presented results. During the workshop, we were able to 
perform several hundred runs per design point, only. We 
calculated two design points for the strategy CE and omitted 
SoF completely.
Additionally, other strategy options for the blue forces 
can be imagined, e.g. a mixture of the strategies CE and SoF. 
The red strategy can also be changed although we consider it 
as very plausible and realistic. A change of a unit’s behavior is 
quite simple to manage since ITSim is designed to provide the 
best possible support to the modeler and therefore has a 
completely agent-based structure. All the entities of the 
simulation (terrain, units, technical elements, weather, 
communication, etc.) are simulated by autonomous agents. 
This technology provides the possibility to adapt the system 
to the requirements of the given operation model in spatial 
(cancellation of the operation area, aggregation of units), 
temporal (time model) and functional terms (behavior of 
units, technical and environmental elements). The scaling of 
the model can be adjusted to the simulation runtime so that 
uninteresting phases can be simulated in time lapse mode or 
low resolution. Additionally, all behaviors of the agents are 
built following a service-oriented approach. Thus, the 
existing services can be reused when developing new 
strategies.
Another future work might be the development of a 
system similar to Automated Red Teaming (in this case Blue 
Teaming) and Automatic Co-Evolution (ACE) aiming in 
automatic evaluation and comparison of the different 
strategies. One core requirement for such a system is the 
integration of experiment design, cluster control and result 
analysis. Additionally, the strategies (technically: parameter 
variations) must be guided heuristically in order to avoid a 
possibly infinite search.
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Team 9: Logistics Battle Command Model
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INTRODUCTION
Several joint and service concepts recognize that the future 
Joint Force may need to be supported from the Sea Base. 
Furthermore, the future Joint Force envisions routine 
delivery of supplies and equipment from the Sea Base by 
unmanned aerial assets.  Currently, unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS) provide an array of aerial sensors and a 
means of delivering munitions to distant targets with no risk 
to operators.  However, there is very few cargo UAS 
developed and deployed on operations that are able to 
distribute commodities.  Since they could contribute to 
improving force protection and enable the reduction of 
inventory for certain commodities, there is merit in 
developing the capability further.  To address this required 
capability, the Marine Corps Combat Development Center 
(MCCDC) is exploring various options for future USMC 
needs for aerial logistics to support sea based distributed 
operations, essentially, to identify the system design 
requirements for future cargo UAS.
IDFW18 OBJECTIVES
This working group overall objective for IDFW18 was to 
explore the use of the Logistics Battle Command (LBC) 
model, a new battle command simulation developed by 
TRAC-Monterey, combined with experimental design 
techniques to identify significant factors and provide 
insights for the assessment of various options for future 
USMC needs for aerial logistics support.  Essentially, the 
intent was to determine the types of operational insights that 
LBC can provide—specifically, in terms of quantifying the 
impacts of cargo UAS capabilities on sea based distributed 
operations.
Particularly, the specific objectives of Team 9 sessions 
during IDFW18 included:
1. Implement the scenario in LBC.
2. Choose the input parameters and measures of 
effectiveness (MOE).
3. Develop the experimental design to examine factors 
of interest to issues of analysis.
4. Execute model production runs.
5. Analyze the simulation output.
LBC MODEL
The LBC model is a low-resolution, object oriented, 
stochastic, and discrete event model programmed in Java 
and incorporates Simkit.  LBC functionality includes 
planning and decision support features to enable a simulated 
sustainment decision maker to monitor the LCOP, forecast 
demand for most classes of supply, and initiate and adjust 
missions to distribute supplies and perform sustainment 
functions.  LBC model uses network architectures to 
represent the distribution pipeline to summon sustainment 
planning and execution representing the end-to-end flow of 
resources from supplier to point of consumption.
LBC model uses nodes and arcs to represent the different 
networks of the distribution system.  LBC model 
accomplishes this through three layers of network 
representation are the transportation, communications, and 
planning networks.  First, the transportation network links 
LBC model to the physical area of operations representing the 
geographical distribution of supplies, and allows for dynamic 
route planning.  Second, the communications network 
represents an arbitrary complex communications network of 
the distribution system linking leaders and soldiers to all 
applicable stakeholders including the LCOP.  Last, the 
planning network represents the data of the distribution 
system information network.
Due to time constraints of IDFW18 and for simplicity, the 
vignette for this effort was implemented in LBC taking 
advantage of some LBC functionalities, essentially implicit 
representation of the transportation network and planning 
network.
VIGNETTE
The vignette modeled is one of sea based distributed 
operations in support of maneuver forces.  These operations 
support persistent sustainment deliveries of class I, III, and V 
from the Sea Base to forward operating bases.  The vignette 
assumed a 30 day operation with random consumption of 
the aforementioned classes of supply. The vignette built on 
LBC was designed to assess the ability to support maneuver 
forces given two different alternative or platforms to deliver 
commodities.
The two alternatives of interest are: ground convoys (base 
case) and cargo UAS (cargo UAS case).  The base case 
represents ground resupply convoys of all  commodities 
required by maneuver forces to increase their  stock levels to 
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the desired level of three days of supply (3DOS).  Conversely, 
the cargo UAS case aerial represents aerial resupply missions 
of a  single type of commodity required by the maneuver 
forces to increase its stock level to the desired level of 3DOS.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
The second objective addressed was the development of 
MOEs.  The three primary MOEs of interest developed are 
velocity, capacity, and rate.  Velocity is expressed as the mean 
time to resupply maneuver units which includes requisition 
time and receiving resupply for each option of delivery 
platform.  Capacity describes the limits of capabilities that 
can be supported from the Sea Base and is driven by the 
functional limitations of each option of delivery platform. 
Rate represents the rate of the resupply mission that flow 
from Sea Base for each option of delivery platform.  These 
MOEs were derived directly from the concept specific 
attributes listed in the Joint Logistics (Distribution) Joint 
Integrating Capabilities (JIC) (2006) and Seabasing JIC 
(2005).
Table 1: NOLH Design
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS
A Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH) design was 
constructed (See Table 1) to develop several experiments 
based on a range of inputs for five factors.  The factors 
considered are platforms available for resupply missions, 
platforms endurance, platform payload, and probability of 
successful delivery of goods.  For simplicity, the factors were 
considered continuous and integer.
RESULTS
Examination of the data sets revealed that the simulation did 
not provide meaningful insights to address the issue of 
analysis.  One clear observation is that  it would be required 
to utilize the three networks of LBC (i.e. transportation 
network, communications network, and planning network) 
in order to refine the vignette, which in turn would provide 
a better level of abstraction of distributed operations in 
accordance with the two JICs aforementioned.  In addition, is 
recommended to explore additional factors for the 
assessment of cargo UAS and their impact on operational 
logistic support.
CONCLUSIONS
The work accomplished throughout IDFW18 was valuable. 
Team 9 participants developed a  scenario, MOEs, and DOE 
to measure the impact of cargo UAS using LBC to support of 
MCCDC research.  Further, throughout the working week 
substantial revisions and expansions of LBC were 
accomplished to improve the functionality and usability of 
the model as a data farming and analysis tool for  the 
operational vignette of interest.
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INTRODUCTION
As the focus of the United States military shifts from 
conventional warfare toward irregular warfare, interest has 
grown in the development of models that can simulate social 
behavior as it pertains to military operations. The 
contemporary operating environment, as reflected in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, shows the critical role the population 
portrays in modern combat.  Populations, whether broken 
into smaller social groups, granulated into individuals, or 
studied as an aggregate of social groups, are often the 
determinate of success in modern combat.  Therefore, the 
military’s interest in modeling social cognition has grown 
out of necessity.  The military uses models for  course of 
action analysis, training and rehearsal, and evaluation for 
acquisition.  If these models are not indicative of 
contemporary operations, they are not only lacking in utility, 
but are potentially harmful.
One new model which combines conventional warfare 
with the modern focus on the population is the Peace Support 
Operations Model (PSOM).  PSOM is a  simulation-based war 
game which portrays the populace and displays the effects 
military and political actions have on the populations.  During 
preliminary use, PSOM 
has shown potential as 
an analytic and 
training tool; however, 
to date the model has 
not been taken through 
any sort of VV&A 
process.  This can 
prove detrimental due 
to the tremendous risk 
inherited from using a 
model that has not 
been thoroughly 
e v a l u a t e d . O u r 
w o r k i n g g ro u p 
quantifiably analyzed 
PSOM using data 
farming to measure the 
limitations  and  constraints  of  the  model.
Methodology
• Our goal for IDFW 18 was to use quantitative analysis to 
explore the capabilities of PSOM.  Because the parameter 
space in a campaign level model such as PSOM is quite 
large,  the basis of our work was to leverage high 
performance computing and efficient design of 
experiments to run the model many times.  This process 
allows for the exploration of a very large parameter 
space in a limited amount of time.  Efficient design of 
experiments and statistical analysis permit us to 
determine which parameters and interactions are 
significant in PSOM.
 The scenario used to test the model is the ongoing war in 
Iraq as of 2004 (figure 3).  This scenario was developed by 
DSTL in 2008.  For the workshop we focused primarily on 
those regions of Iraq which are inhabited by the Sunni 
Population.  This limits the focus to about 30% of the 
population, 37 coalition combat maneuver battalions, and the 
faction of the Sunni Nationalists. The designs of experiments 
focus on the underlying assumptions about the Iraqi 
population, the capabilities and attributes of coalition and 
insurgent forces, the operational courses of action taken by 
coalition forces, and the systematic settings of PSOM.  The 
responses analyzed are primarily the changes in security in 
the nation and the population’s consent towards its own 
government and coalition forces (when needed, other outputs 
are taken into account).  The resulting statistical analysis is 
then used to gain insight into the vast space of possible 
PSOM inputs and their resulting outputs.
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Factor Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Description




CBT Units  Securing 
Sub Stance Patrol
CBT Units Providing 
Humanitarian Aid – 





maneuver BNʼs in 
Sunni inhabited 










Withdrawn 75 Sunni Nationalist 
Units (AQI and 
Militia) in Sunni 
inhabited regions 
take this stance.
IGO Stance Withdrawn Provide 
Humanitarian Aid
47 IGOʼs throughout 




Yes No Determines if the 
coalition and Sunni 
Nationalist share 
information
Table 1. Categorical Factors Explored
Factors explored
During the International Data Farming Workshop we chose 
a set of parameters from the scenario file of PSOM. These 
factors represent many of the assumptions specific to the 
scenario being simulated.  For this experiment these factors 
are applied to either the coalition forces, Sunni nationalists, 
or the Sunni population of Iraq.  Table 1 displays the 
categorical variables manipulated in the DOE.  Table 1. 
Categorical Factors Explored
Table 2 is an explanation of the continuous variables used 
in the experiment.
Factor Experimental Range Description  (Jon Parkman, 2008)
Coalition ROE 
Level 1-5
1 (Loose) and 5 (Tight) representing the 
degree to which the unit is willing to cause 






An integer between 1 (Low) and 5 (High) 
representing the degree to which the Unit is 
willing to suffer its own casualties in order to 
complete its tasks
Sunni ROE 







This is a value between 0 and 100, which 
give the Factionʼs Ideology based on its 
views on Personal freedom, through the 
Nolan chart system, as shown below
Sunni Marginal 
Gains 0-1
These values, one for each Good Type, 
control the level of importance that the Group 
places on the provision of that Good Type
Sunni Marginal 
Gains Security 0-1
This value controls the level of importance 





These values set the initial levels of Consent 
towards each Faction that are possessed by 









Casualty Tolerance value, which controls how 
many casualties the unit will bear each turn 








The level to which the Unit is trained and 




The degree to which the Population 
perceives that the Unit is unwilling to conduct 
offensive operations against them
Table 2. Continuous factors explored.
Description of Scenario
The scenario is Iraq 2004+ created by the developers of 
PSOM.  Figure 3 is a  general Description of the population 
and anti-Iraqi force lay-out used in the scenario.
Design of Experiment and Metrics
We used a  full  factorial design for the categorical variables 
crossed with an NOLH for the continuous variables resulting 
in a  DOE with 3120 design points covering a multitude of 
possible combinations of the factors.  We then ran each 
excursion 5 times in order to account for the very limited 
stochastic influence within PSOM.
The resulting design points were then analyzed using 
quadratic least squares regression models with two way 
interactions where the response variables are either the mean 
Sunni Population’s consent toward the coalition or the mean 
Security across Iraq.  
Figure 1. Iraq Scenario
Results and Analysis
Our resulting meta models proved accurate enough for 
further analysis. (Figure 2)
Figure 2. Consent toward coalition meta-model.
Looking at the scaled effects we found that the initial 
value for consent and the parameter Sunni Marginal gains for 
Security are the most significant factors examined in 
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determining consent.  The contour plot (Figure 3) shows the 
significance of these factors with respect to consent.
Figure 3. Contour plot of Sunni consent toward coalition with 
respect to Marginal Gain Security and Initial Consent.
We also found that coalition stance is a significant factor 
in respect to Sunni Consent for the coalition.
Looking at the response of security we had similar 
success with our meta model.  With an R squared of .76 we 
found the Rules of Engagement setting for factions to be 
particularly significant toward security.  We also found that 
the factions’  stances and the interactions of the stance of 
competing factions is particularly significant in the model as 
can be seen in figure 4.
Conclusions
The team’s main objective was to jointly agree on a set of 
parameters within PSOM which should be interesting and 
then use data farming to determine which of these factors 
truly are influential to both the consent metric and the 
security metric within PSOM.  Our hasty analyses conducted 
during the last day of the workshop proved positive toward 
PSOM potential uses.  Clearly the underlying assumptions 
about the population have tremendous implications on the 
model.  Also, we gained tremendous insight about the effects 
player decisions have toward both security and consent.  We 
clearly met our main objectives and in doing so have 
displayed the power of data farming in regards to the 
VV&A process for contemporary combat models.  
Stance
0 - Provide Humanitarina Aid
1 - Attack
2 - Provide Security
8 - Withdrawn
Figure 4. Line chart showing effects of stance 
with respect to security.
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Team 11: Frigate Defense Effectiveness in 
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INTRODUCTION
Both traditional and asymmetric threats continue to pose 
challenges to any combatant commander in a Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operation. 
Limited threats that were once confined to littoral and brown 
waters now extend to the green water theater. Many NATO 
countries operate frigates in green water SSTR missions, 
typically as a single unit scouting vast areas. In the calm 
waters of the Mediterranean and Gulf of Aden, small, agile, 
fast and usually cheap small craft are often encountered. 
In this study we investigate the question of whether a 
swarm of 4 - 8 small vessels, armed with hand-held weapons, 
can attack and achieve a mission kill on a typical NATO FFH 
operating in a SSTR mission. In this context our primary 
goals for IDFW18 were to examine the factors driving the 
model and create a suitable experimental design. Our 
secondary goals were to create inputs based on the selected 
design, conduct runs on the SEED Center’s cluster computer, 
and analyze the output of the model for any interesting 
results. 
Figure 1: Frigate and Attacker (SAFC) placement map
Modeling
The scenario consists of a single frigate, sometimes 
accompanied by a helicopter, operating in open waters (Fig. 
1). The frigate is attacked by four or eight small agile and 
fast craft (SAFC) of varying types and armament. The 
measure of the defenders effectiveness is whether or not the 
frigate survives this engagement. The frigate will be 
considered to have 'lost' the scenario when it is hit as many 
times as it has allocated hit points. This approach allows us 
to model the frigate as a single entity, rather than modeling 
all compartments, personnel and machinery.
Factors
Many factors affect the outcome of an encounter. Some of 
these factors, such as frigate armament and Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), are controllable by 
NATO forces. Other factors, such as the number of SAFCs or 
their weaponry, cannot be controlled by NATO forces. 
Because of this, we chose to analyze the model using robust 
design techniques. Factors are classified as controllable or 
uncontrollable. The latter are referred to as “noise factors.” 
The noise factors are varied to see how much impact they 
have, but are not used as independent variables in the 
analysis. Instead, we calculate a measure of “loss” for each 
design point in the controllable factor space. The loss 
function is based on both the expected performance and the 
variance at each point, calculated over the noise factors.
For the controllable factors, a 22 factor NOLH design 
was chosen. The total number of factors for the frigate was 47, 
so several groups of related factors were “lockstepped,” i.e., 
all elements within a group were varied in identical fashion 
based on a common scale factor. Consider the main gun of a 
frigate as an example. The lower the inter-firing time, the 
more ammo it will carry. Probably it will also be designed 
with a wide firing arc since it represents a modern weapon 
system. All three of these factors were therefore varied in 
unison.
Since the objective is to induce variability with the noise 
factors rather than directly estimate their impact, a  much 
sparser design can be used.  We chose a Hadamard matrix of 
size 20 to vary noise factors between their minimum and 
maximum values. The NOLH and Hadamard designs were 
then crossed to create a study file with 2480 design points.
Item Minimum Maximum 
Max speed 14 kt 35 kt
Main Guns 1 x 76mm 1 x 127mm, AP-Round
Auxiliary Guns None 2 x 30mm, targeting computer
Small Guns 2 x 7,62 MG 2 x 12.7 mm, computer stabilized
CIWS None 30 mm full auto gun / missiles
Heli Max Speed 120 kt 190 kt
Helicopters None 1 
#AGM-114N (if 
Helicopter) 2 8
Table1: Main blue design factors
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Tactics
All weapons exchanges were modeled using a step function 
for hit probabilities. Each weapon was assigned a minimum 
and a  maximum effective range. This has three reasons. First, 
the level of abstraction chosen dictates some abstraction on 
the hit probabilities. The second reason is to prevent the 
model from wasting ammunition on extremely low hit 
probabilities, due to MANA constraints. The third reason is 
that it is actually not possible to calculate even a remotely 
true P(hit) based on factors such as wind, target speed, size 
and facing. Instead, these are subsumed within the 
randomness, and should average out over the effective range 
of the step function.
Actual Rules of Engagement do not allow for the frigate to 
shoot at an approaching SAFC until the hostile intent of each 
individual SAFC is determined, either by firing upon the 
frigate or closing to within a reaction range despite 
warnings. Variations in the reaction range and reaction type 
will represent the use of non-lethal weapons as well as ROE 
reaction distances. The frigate must assume that all 
approaching vessels are in fact neutral. One of our research 
questions is to see if reaction distances to these threats 
actually make a difference.
As mentioned before, the Frigate, SAFC, and  Helicopter 
robustness and skills were modeled using hit points. For the 
SAFC the variation in hit points reflects not only their inherent 
survivability, but also their agility and sea-state influences.
DATA ANALYSIS
Two replications over the design space were performed. The 
loss function was calculated by collapsing each replication 
over the noise factors and calculating the mean and standard 
deviation of the frigates killed. We used a squared-error loss 
function, which is constructed by summing squared 
deviations from the ideal outcome (zero frigates killed) with 
variance.  Low loss values are achieved by consistently 
having a low expected number of successful attacks against 
the frigate.  Loss will increase if more attacks are successful 
or if the observed results are inconsistent, i.e., highly 
variable.
 
Figure 3: Sorted parameter Estimates
The first analysis was done using partition trees. Most 
important splits were on HellfireAmmo>2, AuxGun 
HitProbability, Frigate Hit points and ROE Engagement 
Distance>900yards.
The second analysis was done using a multiple regression 
analysis. All main effects, two-way interactions, and quadratic 
effects were considered for the controllable factors.  Most of 
the terms were not statistically significant, and our final 
model yielded an R2 of 0.86 with five main effects and three 
interaction terms (Fig. 3). 
CONCLUSIONS
The results using partition trees and regression analysis both 
indicate a  set of capabilities needed for successfully 
defending against small swarms. Both show that in this 
setup, the Hellfire equipped Helicopter is paramount. This 
was expected and validating, as other studies had shown 
comparable results. It is also noteworthy that the Helicopter 
is a cofactor in all interaction terms in the regression 
analysis. Both of the frigate’s organic damage sustainment 
capabilities are also important. Whether these are in the form 
of specially designed compartments, armor or damage 
control, the survivability of the frigate is an important factor. 
Of equal importance are auxiliary guns with a high 
probability to hit. Hit probability for this type of weapons is 
achieved by good weapon characteristics and either a lot of 
training, or a computer controlled weapon mount. These 
mounts are common sights on new vessels, and should be 
refitted on older ones. An ROE engagement distance of 900 
yards or more is important, as the main weapon of the 
attackers, the RPG-7, has an absolute maximum range of 940 
yards. Nonetheless it is interesting to note that after the 
small craft passed the 900 yard threshold, it does not matter 
if the frigate begins to defend at 800 or at 200 yards distance. 
This is reassuring both for the use of non-lethal weapons, 
and for typical ROEs.
An interesting observation is that there are no important 
quadratic terms in the regression model.  The observed 
outcomes are well predicted using only linear terms and their 
interactions.
Both the main gun and the CIW Systems had no 
significant role in this model. This may be explained by the 
fact that both have, in these scenarios, a  relatively long 
minimum attack distance, and both have a relatively high 
inter-target time. As MANA does not allow us to model inter-
target time explicitly, it is included in the inter-firing times. 
This results in quite a slow rate of fire for both weapon 
systems. 
The small guns modeled were also not significant. We 
infer that the other defense systems were too dominant for 
these guns to show up as a contributing factor.
Some of the lockstepped factors showed up as 
significant. Future research should therefore use a new design 
of experiments so that the lockstepped factors will  not be 
confounded. Influential factors such as hit points should be 
investigated further, to determine whether the results are 
based on design, armor or crew capability. Of highest interest 
should be the crew’s performance, as it is the only factor 
changeable for contemporary designs. Finally, a red teaming/
red tactics approach should be used to determine which 
changes may be employed by the SAFC to counteract any of 
the frigate’s new tactics and armament.
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INTRODUCTION
This report describes the primary effort of the Cultural 
Geography team to produce a scenario, experimental design 
and analysis using the prototype Cultural  Geography (CG) 
agent-based model of civilian population in stability 
operations. This report provides a brief model overview, a 
summary of the scenario, a description of the experimental 
design and the emerging analysis results.
In addition to the Cultural Geography modeling and 
analysis described in this report, the team engaged in the 
following major activities during the International Data 
Farming Workshop: (1) Cultural Geography model and data 
ontology development, (2) Irregular Warfare metrics 
crosswalk between doctrine and model, (3) Senturion 
modeling and analysis briefing by Brett Marvin (Sentia 
Group), and (4) Tactical wargame Task-Event-Outcome (TEO) 
integration with Cultural Geography modeling methodology.
MODEL, DATA AND SCENARIO
The model, data and scenario are described below. 
Model Overview
The purpose of the CG model is to explore the response of 
the civilian population to insurgent, government and 
coalition force actions in a stability operations context. The 
model represents a “conflict ecosystem” as described by Dr. 
David J. Kilcullen in his “Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory 
and Practice, 2007” (Kilkullen, 2007) report: 
1. Multiple independent but interlinked (by social 
network) actors (i.e. agents); 
2. Each seeks to maximize their own survivability and 
advantage; 
3. Actors collaborate or compete and are often 
combative and destructive; 
4. Coalition forces are not outside this ecosystem, but 
are players in it; and 
5. Coalition forces intend to control the system’s 
destructive, combative elements and transform to a 
“normal” state where normal is from the 
perspective of the population.
The Cultural  Geography prototype implements an agent-
based modeling approach. An agent-based model (ABM) 
simulates the actions and interactions of autonomous entities 
in order to assess the effect of their actions on the system as a 
whole. ABM implementations combine elements of game 
theory, complex adaptive systems, emergence, computational 
social science, multi-agent systems, and evolutionary 
programming. Monte Carlo methods introduce randomness 
into the model and allow for systematic exploration of the 
effect of inputs on outputs using experimental designs.
The environment modeled includes agents, objects and 
events. Agents are the actors in the simulation.  These include 
representative members of society and other individuals or 
groups that influence the society. Infrastructure objects in the 
model provide goods and services.  These goods and services 
are questions of public interest. Events are effects as well as 
information about goods and services that influence agents.
Internally, agents process information about events based 
on their beliefs and attitudes toward other agents involved in 
the event or agents considered responsible. Agents maintain 
and adjust a  set of beliefs and positions on issues. Externally, 
agents transact and take physical actions. Simulation rules 
mediate the interactions among agents and between an agent 
and things in the environment. These rules govern how 
information is transmitted, media are exchanged and physical 
actions affect agents and things.
Scenario Description
The scenario is unclassified and loosely based on the city of 
Amarah in Iraq circa 2008. It represents a battalion area of 
operations (AO) as a brigade combat team conducts stability 
operations to improve security and infrastructure while 
supporting local elections.
Among the early tasks in the scenario development is to 
determine the population of interest in the AO and develop 
associated socio-demographic, socio-cultural & social-
economic data. Demographic data are selected population 
39 - IDFW 18 - Team 12
characteristics such as ethnicity, age, income, mobility, 
educational attainment, home ownership, employment status, 
and location.  Cultural data includes the set of shared 
attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize an 
institution, organization or group. Examples of cultural data 
are networks, religion, ethnic distinctions, personal 
motivators, information and persuasion. Economic data 
concerns the production, distribution, and consumption of 
goods and services. Examples are production, consumption, 
supply, demand, employment, and wages.
This data guides the determination of the most important 
identity dimensions in the population, which may include 
factors such as age, religion, education, tribe, ethnicity, region, 
etc. From those dimensions we produce population segments 
by identity and then partition the population by stereotype 
composites. A critical part of the process is to produce a 
narrative for each identity dimension and then to produce a 
narrative for each stereotype. Army and Marine Corps 
doctrine indicates that the most important cultural form for 
counterinsurgents to understand is the narrative (Department 
of the Army, Headquarters, 2006).
The social data is also used to develop the social network, 
which links population entities in the model. We determine 
the strength of relationship between agent Stereotypes 
applying the concepts of homophily and propinquity. 
Homophily is the tendency to bond with like others, while 
propinquity refers to the opportunity for interaction. We 
determine the associated level of trust and influence, which 
correlates with the strength of relationship and varies 
depending on the culture. These levels are driven primarily by 
tribal affiliation in this case. We finally determine the density 
(connectivity) of the social network; this also varies 
depending on the culture and is a strong candidate for data 
farming since it is not easily estimated. We then use social 
network software (e.g., ORA or UCINET) to analyze the 
network.
Also included in the entity and social network 
development are the many groups that often play critical 
roles in influencing the population in a conflict environment, 
but are largely beyond the control of military forces or 
civilian governing institutions. These include local leaders, 
informal associations, religious groups, families, tribes, as 
well as some private enterprises, humanitarian groups and 
media. During scenario development, the team determined 
which groups have influence over the population; group 
beliefs, values, interests and positions; and each groups’ 
behaviors and events.
Concurrently, we determine what issues are salient to 
both the population and to the operation. Examples are 
security, essential services, legitimate authority, social justice, 
jobs, infrastructure and economics. We state the issues as 
questions: 
• Is security in Amarah adequate?
• Are you satisfied with efforts to improve basic services 
provided by the infrastructure in Amarah?
• Will upcoming elections produce a legitimate 
government for Amarah?
We then determine what positions on issues are 
advocated by influence groups and sectors of the population 
and determine from the narratives which values, beliefs and 
interests influence issue positions. We conceptually determine 
the beliefs, values & interests that influence the population on 
the issue and construct Bayesian networks for each. We then 
develop case files that represent opinion samples for each 
population stereotype. Finally, we use the case files to 
estimate the probability data for the stereotypes’ Bayesian 
networks.
We next determine the set of relevant behaviors in the 
population. Candidate behaviors include communicating and 
influencing, economic activity, political activity, and support 
to various actors. We determine the related factors that 
influence behavior including attitudes toward the behavior, 
social norms about the behavior, and perceptions of 
behavioral control. We conceptually model the behavior with 
a Bayesian network and develop case files that provide the 
probability information for the Bayesian network. This 
approach applies the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 
1991), which is used to determine how the actor forms 
intentions to act—especially on a recurring basis.
Completing the scenario requires definition of events, 
which occur at a headline level because scenarios typically 
run over the course of six months to several years. Events are 
only relevant in the model if they produce an effect, change 
the functioning of an entity or object, or influence behavior or 
beliefs, values, interests and positions. Typically, the 
information surrounding the event is as important as or more 
important than the event itself. We define the possible events 
in the scenario, develop methods to implement event 
outcomes, and develop case files for the influence of events.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The Cultural Geography team produced a scenario, 
experimental design and analysis using the prototype 
Cultural Geography agent-based model of civilian 
population. The results produced and analysis of this 
prototype provides the team insights into model calibration 
and validation requirements.  The following sections present 
the experimental design and emerging analysis results.
Experimental Design
A five factor, 17 design point Nearly Orthogonal Latin 
Hypercube experimental design was used for this proof of 
principle work. Three decision factors and two noise factors 
were used in the design. These factors were chosen because 
of their impact on issue stance within the model. By varying 
these factors in a systematic way through our experimental 
design, the intent was to show that these factors did, in fact, 
impact the issue stance of entities within the model, 
confirming that the model functioned as intended. 
Decision Factors: 
• Mean time between Coalition Force Activity: The time 
between potential execution of coalition force events.
• Mean time between JAM Activity: The time between 
potential execution of JAM events.
• Mean time between AAH Activity: The time between 
potential execution of AAH events.
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Noise Factors:
• Delay in Message Passage: Delay in transmission of 
knowledge of an event through the social network by 
an entity.
• Max Number of Recipients of Message: Maximum 
number of recipients of a message through the social 
network.
Table 1: Experimental Design.
Analysis
The model outputs are configurable to the needs of the 
analysis. In this proof of principle work, the primary outputs 
were the issue stances of each entity on each of the three 
issues represented in the model over time. As discussed 
earlier, the three issues were 1) satisfaction with security, 2) 
satisfaction about infrastructure, and 3) belief that elections 
would produce a legitimate government. This data was 
reduced and aggregated to show the change in issue stance 
over time for each design point for each of the 48 population 
stereotypes and each of the 11 demographic categories.  
Figure 1: One way analysis of mean 'end of run’ satisfaction with 
security in Amarah by demographic subtype.
The analysis here focuses on the issue related to 
satisfaction with security. Figure 1 shows the mean change in 
security issue stance for over all  runs for all demographic 
subtypes. Noteworthy is the narrow range of all values from 
48-52% satisfied for all demographic subtypes for all design 
points. This small  range of changes indicates that no one 
subtype experiences large changes to issue stance. However, 
changes did, in fact, occur over the course of the run. This 
indicates a need for further calibration of the model, 
specifically focusing on the magnitude of the effect of events 
on issue stance.
Figure 2 illustrates the maximum observed level of 
satisfaction with security in Amarah by demographic 
subtype. The maximum observed satisfaction levels 
range from 55% for members of the Bani Lam tribe to 
near 80% for members of the educated class in Amarah. 
Figure 2: One way analysis of maximum observed satisfaction 
with security in Amarah by demographic subtype.
Similarly, Figure 3 shows the minimum level of 
satisfaction with security in Amarah experienced by each of 
the subtypes. Taken together these three graphs illustrate that 
over the course of a year, as represented in the model, the 
educated citizens of Amarah’s level of satisfaction with 
security spanned a range from 38-77% satisfaction before 
settling near 50% by the end of the year. This confirms that 
the model is behaving as expected. Further analysis is 
required to trace the full path of public opinion through the 
model over time and to further explore the causal 
mechanisms behind these changes in issue stance.
Figure 3: One way analysis of minimum observed satisfaction 
with security in Amarah by demographic subtype.
Regression analysis using the five factors from the 
experimental design as predictors for the mean response of 
the population as a whole was conducted considering out to 
third order interactions to identify the factors that most 
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influence the model. Not surprisingly, this model accounted 
for only a  small portion of the variability in the response of 
the entire population of Amarah, RSq= 0.14.  This is not 
surprising since each subgroup within the model responds in 
a unique manner to events based on their internal beliefs. 
Also, not surprisingly, the most significant contributors to the 
mean satisfaction of the population with security were the 
level of JAM activity and coalition force activity (as a third 
order term). Again this is consistent with what one would 
expect as these actors both initiate events that impact civilian 
population issue stances. Surprisingly, the level of AAH 
activity was not a significant contributor, but the delay in 
transmission of information across the social network did 
have a significant impact. AAH was a significant actor within 
the model, but with a smaller base of support within the 
overall population. Thus, one might expect that a detailed 
analysis of subgroups would reveal a  larger impact from AAH 
initiated events within the model. The delay in message traffic 
showing as a significant factor in the mean issue stance of the 
overall population shows that this portion of the model is 
functioning correctly.
Figure 4: Contour plot of impact of the interaction between 
JAM and coalition force activity on mean satisfaction 
on security for the overall populace.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between JAM 
and coalition force activity within the model. The scale 
represents the mean time between the execution of 
events within the model by each actor.
Figure 5: Interaction of JAM and coalition force rates of activity 
with mean satisfaction with security for educated and non-
educated subtypes.
Figure 5 shows the difference in the response to varying 
levels of JAM and coalition force activity for  the educated and 
non-educated segments of the population. 
As an initial step to a more detailed analysis, a regression 
model was fit for the subgroup consisting of military age, 
educated members of the Dawa party and the Bani Lam tribe 
using the mean change in satisfaction on the issue of security 
as the response, in Figure 6 below.
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Figure 6: Stepwise regression model of the mean 
change in military age, educated members of the 
Dawa party and Bani Lam tribe.
Note that the model accounts for a much greater portion 
of the variability in the response, as expected given the 
uniqueness of each particular subgroups’ interpretation of the 
events within the model. The analysis shows that the greatest 
contribution to the change in the mean level  of satisfaction for 
this subgroup came from the level of JAM and AAH activity. 
Coalition force level of activity only becomes significant in 
the response as an interaction with JAM level of activity. 
The contour plot below illustrates the impact of the 
interaction between JAM and coalition force activity on this 
population subgroups satisfaction with security within the 
model. The scale of this change highlights the need for further 
model calibration. In general, the greatest change occurs when 
the rate of JAM activity is less frequent. [FIG 7  HAS JAM/CF 
ON DIFFERENT AXES THAN FIG 5]
Figure 7: Contour plot of impact of JAM and 
coalition force actions on mean change in satisfaction 
on the issue of security for military age, educated 
members of the Dawa party and Bani Lam tribe.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The team collected data for each agent throughout each of 
the model runs.  Analysis of this data provided emerging 
insights for further exploration:
• Assess model calibration based on population 
stereotypes and their unique narratives.
• Trace population opinion over time to understand 
causal relationships of events with issue stances.
• Expand experimental design to better understand 
social network configuration.
• Continue analysis of other issues in the model 
(infrastructure and elections).
CONCLUSIONS
The International Data Farming Workshop provided an 
opportunity to prepare, present and collaborate about the 
current state of the CG model.  The team successfully 
executed an experimental design using the proof of principle 
Cultural Geography model.  The scenario is loosely based on 
the city of Amarah in Iraq circa 2008 and represents 
significant population elements, influencing groups, their 
social networks, infrastructure, and events.  The team 
collected dynamic data about agent stances enabling 
emerging insights about the model.  Analysis of the collected 
data demonstrates that many functions of the model are 
operating as designed, while also providing insights into 
model improvements, data collection and analysis needs, 
and validation possibilities.  The CG team will continue to 
explore the data from the scenario described above and 
improve the CG model.
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